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Modern scientific psychology continues to advance toward newer and greater discoveries of the 
inner workings of the human mind, posited in the belief that a universal objectivity exists if only 
to be found. Despite the professional emphasis on conducting psychological enterprises in this 
manner, the field has spent much of its formalized existence struggling to answer some of its 
most basic questions. This paper thoroughly explores the nature of a scientific psychology, while 
suggesting that psychology may find wisdom in its philosophical origins. It further suggests that 
psychology continue toward a postmodern epistemology, in which a unitary psychological reality 
is abandoned for the realties that exist within the minds of unique individuals. Social 
constructionism provides the foundation for the postmodern theory throughout the paper. To 
highlight the character of this discussion, the concept of diagnosis is carefully examined, with the 
diagnosis of depression serving as the chief example. In the context of this conversation, research 
was conducted that attempts to explore the contemporary epistemological and diagnostic beliefs 
of both beginning and advanced clinicians. This research included the use of an online survey 
that asked current clinical and counseling psychologists about their views regarding the diagnosis 
of depression, and the practice of diagnosis more generally. Current doctoral students in clinical 
and counseling psychology programs were also surveyed, to observe chronological changes in 
perspective. 
Keywords: diagnosis, depression, social constructionism 
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Philosophical Ends to Scientific Means: Diagnosis and the Epistemology of Psychology 
 The field of psychology has undergone much reiteration in what constitutes valid and 
appropriate research and practice. While its origins have been heavily influenced by classic 
philosophical thought (Gurwitsch, 2009), a more modern era has ushered in an age of prevailing 
“medical naturalism” that seeks to place suffering and illness within a reductionistic biological 
domain (Giorgi, 2014; LaFrance & Stoppard, 2006; Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999; Ussher, 2010). This 
line of thinking is invested in the notion that an objective reality exists, which can be observed 
and known through careful scientific deliberation and study. Observation serves as a tool for 
collecting data, while simultaneously determining what is from what is not (Gergen, 2015).  
 This paper examines many of the historical roots of psychotherapeutic practice, in order 
to develop an understanding of how diagnosis has become an essential part of it. It looked 
specifically at the diagnosis of depression, and attempts to form a coherent narrative of how this 
illness has been conceptualized and classified over the last several centuries. Later in this paper, 
new survey research is discussed which examined modern beliefs about diagnosis and 
depression, as endorsed by clinical and counseling psychologists and clinical and counseling 
doctoral students. 
Depression Statistics and Study Overview  
 As the modernist scientific ontology has pervaded the clinical landscape, the adjoining 
epistemological determinants guiding treatment have shaped our understanding of diagnosis. The 
most formal exemplar of this is found within the pages of the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The most recent 
edition of this manual, the DSM-5, was released in 2013 and began reshaping diagnosis across 
the United States once again (APA, 2013). While adding some brief considerations regarding the 




role of culture in understanding mental illness, the DSM-5 continues to admonish the importance 
of a medical naturalist stance, prioritizing the objectivity of the disorders listed (APA, 2013). 
 Another highly influential text that impacts the global understanding of mental illness is 
the World Health Organization’s, International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related 
Health Problems (ICD). This classification system has undergone 10 major revisions, with the 
eleventh due in the next few years. The ICD includes classification for mental disorders and 
describes the tens of thousands of physiological illnesses that medical professionals encounter as 
a part of their practice (WHO, 1992). This pairing makes it clear that it is believed mental illness 
has similar biological origins as the many other illnesses listed within the ICD’s pages.  
  Social and cultural factors are recognized as having some impact on the etiology of 
mental illness, but these recognitions seem to imply that these factors play a background role in 
comparison to their biological underpinnings. While used in conjunction with the DSM-5 in the 
United States, the ICD has been the primary and/or sole manual for diagnosis in much of the rest 
of the world (WHO, 1992). The medical naturalist epistemology reflected in the ICD further 
highlights the predominance of the modernist perspective in society today. In many cases, the 
diagnostic classifications of mental illness listed within the ICD-10 are nearly indistinguishable 
from those in the DSM-5. In recognition of time and the purposes of this paper, both systems of 
classification will be viewed as conceptually the same.  
 One of the disorders of primary concern within the DSM-5 is Major Depressive Disorder. 
It is currently viewed as a major health issue worldwide by the World Health Organization 
(WHO, 2002, 2017). It is the most prevalent psychiatric disorder, and is the leading cause of 
disability among women across the globe (WHO, 2000). Of the millions who suffer with a Major 
Depressive Disorder, approximately 15% – 40% may end up making a nonfatal suicide attempt 




(Holma et al., 2010). Sadly, nearly 15% of those with a Major Depressive Disorder will end up 
completing suicide (Gradus et al., 2010; Maris, Berman, & Silverman, 2000; Sainsbury, 1986). 
Major Depressive Disorder also places a heavy burden on the United States’ economy, costing 
approximately $210.5 billion dollars annually in medical expenses (Greenberg, Fournier, 
Sisitsky, Pike, & Kessler, 2015). Overall, the depressive disorders are thought to impact 
approximately 322 million people around the world (WHO, 2017). 
 Despite these concerns, there remains a significant amount of debate about whether 
Major Depressive Disorder is most usefully understood as described by the DSM (Black, White, 
& Hannum, 2007; Cromby, 2004; LaFrance & Stoppard, 2006; Mulder, 2008; Parker, 2005; 
Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999; Ussher, 2010). Much of this controversy surrounds the treatment 
methods that a medical naturalist position recommends for the treatment of depression. When 
viewed predominantly as a disease with biological origins, a biological solution is implied. This 
biological solution often takes the form of antidepressant medication and recent research has 
found that approximately 11% of people in the United States 12 and older are currently taking 
some form of antidepressant medication (Pratt, Brody, & Gu, 2011). 
 While modern psychotherapeutic practice can broadly be understood as coming from a 
predominantly positivist/naturalist paradigm, there are specific models that attempt to paint a 
clearer understanding of how disorders like depression develop. The foremost of these models is 
called the “Diathesis-Stress Model” (Chang, Yu, Chang, & Hirsch, 2016; Rioux,          
Castellanos-Ryan, Parent, & Seguin, 2016; Santor, 2003). This theory suggests that the 
development of illnesses such as anxiety and depression are largely dependent on the 
individual’s level of vulnerability (diathesis) and the amount of stress they are experiencing. The 
vulnerability component of the theory pays significant attention to genetic factors, and the 




likelihood that some members of society will be naturally more susceptible to the effects of 
increased stress. When a person with high vulnerability encounters life events that are 
particularly stressful, it is believed that an illness such as depression may develop as the person 
becomes overwhelmed and unable to cope (Santor, 2003). 
 The diathesis-stress model was heavily influenced by the work of Richard Lazarus (1966) 
who hypothesized that a person’s experience of stress is largely dependent on how they 
conceptualized it in their mind. A person’s view of the stress they are experiencing may vary 
based on their appraisal of the situation, and whether they believe their stress to be manageable 
or overwhelming (Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus, 2001; Lazarus, Deese, & Osler, 1952). Factors such 
as hope and trauma (Chang et al., 2003), temperament (Rioux et al., 2016), dependency (Santor, 
2003), and motivation (Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus, 2001), and how they affect the likelihood of an 
individual developing mental illness have also been examined through this lens. 
 While the diathesis-stress model of mental illness attempts to consider contextual factors 
that lead to suffering, it is typically seated within the broader modernist epistemology described 
above. Various articles seek to address the naturalist dilemma of measuring and objectively 
observing the mediating factors that play a role in the diathesis-stress relationship (Chang et al., 
2003; Lazarus, 1952; Rioux et al., 2016; Santor, 2003). While this is likely a noble task, other 
theoretical models may call into question the likelihood of applying the level of desired 
objectivity to such complicated social concepts. 
 In contrast to a modernist and/or medical naturalist perspective, alternative views of 
mental health, diagnosis, and suffering exist. One perspective is found within the theory of social 
constructionism. Social constructionism is a postmodern perspective within the field of 
psychology that rejects many of the previously held modernist views. It challenges the notion 




that individual knowledge exists, and that the external world is observable by individuals seeking 
to discern truth. Instead, it proposes that knowledge is shared between individuals in relationship 
with one another (Gergen, 2001; Gergen, 2009; Gergen, Lightfoot, & Sydow, 2004). 
 From this perspective, the mainstream system of diagnostic classification observed in the 
DSM-5 would be viewed as a dominant cultural narrative of suffering and illness. While 
containing some utility and value, it would not be seen as an objective reality explaining the 
experiences of people in a universal way. Instead, social constructionism suggests that each 
individual holds their own unique subjective reality, which defines how they experience 
suffering and pain (Gergen, 2009). The narratives produced by these unique perspectives would 
be given priority in psychological treatment, as there would be no alternative view believed to be 
more valid. In this way, social constructionism suggests a very egalitarian approach toward 
understanding the distress experienced by others (Gergen, 1994; Gergen, 2009). 
 Since understanding the suffering of others is a primary concern of those practicing 
within the field of mental health, it is important that the epistemologies utilized for shaping these 
understandings are continuously placed under thoughtful scrutiny. This paper offers an in-depth 
examination of the literature describing some of the historical changes in ideology toward 
understanding human suffering. In particular, it explores a variety of perspectives and their 
consequent understandings of diagnosis. Diagnoses of depression are explored throughout this 
paper as a catalyst for facilitating this discussion. 
 As a part of this scholarly discussion, research was conducted that examined the beliefs 
of current mental health practitioners. These mental health provider participants included 
seasoned professionals in the field, and those who are relatively new to the field or still 
completing their graduate training. Insights into the complexities of topics like diagnosis and 




depression were gained through examining the beliefs of those in the mental health field. This 
research contributed to our understanding of how diagnosis and depression show up in clinical 
practice in a practical way. The results of this research also highlighted possible changes in the 
field between those who underwent their graduate training in decades past, and those who are 
currently making their way through this process. Discrepancies between clinicians’ views about 
diagnosis and their actual use of diagnosis in clinical practice were also of interest. These 
research findings assisted in the formulation of a more comprehensive understanding of how 
theoretical epistemologies impact clinical treatment, and the role of diagnosis as a part of this 
process. 
Literature Review 
Brief History of Psychology 
 Before delving into the complex history of psychological classification and the diagnosis 
of depression, it seems fitting to provide a brief history of the field of psychology in general. As 
implicitly and explicitly reinforced throughout this paper, context has a profound impact on the 
development of thoughts and ideas, and thoughts and ideas shape the way we conceive of 
problems and generate their solutions. This makes it an essential task to understand cultural 
context so that our awareness of streams of thought and their action-based implications can be 
thoroughly understood. 
 Searching for an official beginning to the field of psychology can be an arduous task 
because the origin of psychology is like a large tree, supported by a myriad of deep roots that 
support its growth and stability. Like a large tree, many of these roots often go unnoticed, buried 
by years of historically layered sediment and the by-products of change over time. Given the 
present contexts and purposes of this paper, I was not able to exhaustively explore each of these 




roots, nor dig deep into the specific roles these roots have played in making psychology what it is 
today. A discussion of this magnitude would likely take a lifetime. Despite this, an awareness of 
some of these origins was valuable in assessing the ground from which diagnosis sprung, while 
examining the intellectual conditions that made the past ripe for a modernist epistemology of 
mental health. 
Many searching for the birth of the field of psychology look to the year 1879, when the 
early psychological experimenter Wilhelm Wundt first set up his laboratory in Leipzig Germany 
(Hatfield, 2002; Laungani, 2004). Wundt came from a philosophical background, and at one 
point was the chair of a philosophy department. In his work, however, he began to develop a 
more modernist notion, that though the mind is an abstract concept, its principles and functions 
could be understood by utilizing experimental deliberation (Laungani, 2004).  
While Wundt’s discourse in scientific thought certainly gained detractors, it also fit well 
with a broader culture of academic progression that was looking to create a new discipline. 
Adherents to this new way of conceptualizing the mind felt that psychology could become a 
distinct study from philosophy. By making this distinction, difficult abstractions became less 
burdensome or were otherwise scrutinized through proper experimentation. Many researchers at 
the time were also motivated by the possibility of making psychology a science akin to other 
natural sciences, where ground-breaking discoveries could be made, and revolutionary ideas 
could have an impact on the world (Hatfield, 2002; Laungani, 2004).  
Utilizing the year 1879 as the marker for the origin of the field fits relatively well in a 
modernist narrative of psychology as a science, where careful observation is thought to beget 
truth and knowledge. It also fits well in a narrative that seeks to distinguish or separate the field 
of psychology from philosophy. However, this inauguration does not fit well in a broader 




cultural narrative, where the importance of philosophical thought is viewed as critically vital for 
understanding how psychological inquiry became possible. We can assert that 1879 may be 
viewed as a meaningful and important birthdate for the scientific psychology that has continued 
to dominate much of the academic and professional landscape, even to the present day (Hatfield, 
2002; Laungani, 2004). Alternatively considered, it is likely that there exists no birthday for what 
we now consider psychology, but rather that “psychology” is a term that was collectively and 
culturally chosen to describe a broad swath of philosophical thoughts and ideas that were 
connected to the existential question of what it means to be human and have human experiences.  
In exploring the origins of these important questions, we must look to antiquity, and the 
early writings of philosophers who sought answers to difficult human questions. Before this 
exploration, it is important to observe the role of “Historical Myopia.” Historical Myopia is the 
idea that when events and ideas are closer to us historically, we tend to have a greater sense of 
their meaningful details and the knowledge they pass along. This can lead to a tendency to 
perceive comparatively recent events or ideas as more frequent, intense, or important because the 
information we have about them is more robust (Pinker, 2011). This valuable perspective 
informs us that though we look to ancient philosophers of historical acclaim for our academic or 
professional ancestry, it is likely that many relevant and related questions were considered by 
humans who existed in the many millennia before them. Their relevant stories or writings no 
longer exist, and therefore we are unable to hear from them or consider their contributions. This 
may serve as an egalitarian reminder about what it means to be human and understand human 
suffering. It is something that is shared by each person, not only those who make it their 
profession or choose to study it for a lifetime. 




Aristotle, Plato, St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, John Locke, Rene Descartes, Immanuel 
Kant, Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger and others should be recognized as some of the most 
influential philosophers who have had an impact on present day psychology. For the purposes of 
this study, I did not go deeply into the histories of each classic thinker, but a few are covered, 
with concise summaries of their major works. Aristotle spent a great deal of time considering the 
“mind-body problem” and the role of the “soul” in human experience. He further spoke of the 
importance of reason, and how this quality separates humans from animals (Watson, 1963).  
St. Augustine, a theologian and early member of the Christian church, had a dramatic 
impact on the development of western philosophy, and thus the field of psychology centuries 
later. St. Augustine spoke at length about the relationship between the body, the soul, and the 
spirit. He also formulated early ideas about the roles of sensation and perception as parts of 
personal experience. One of St. Augustine’s major contributions also includes the importance of 
personal reflectivity, and an observation of the inner self as a means of developing knowledge 
and wisdom (Hölscher, 2013). 
Influenced heavily by Aristotle and St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas was another 
theologian who began thinking about a variety of concepts central to modern-day psychology. Of 
these, Aquinas continued a historical discussion on the body, mind, and soul, while also 
considering the role of knowledge as reality-shaping. Aquinas furthered our understandings of 
reason, rationality, and truth (Butera, 2010; Pasnau, 2002). Recent research has taken a close 
look at the similarities between Aaron Beck’s Cognitive Therapy and the writings of Thomas 
Aquinas. This work suggests Aquinas had developed and considered many of the key principles 
central to a more modern understanding of cognitions and their impact on emotions (Butera, 
2010).  




As can be seen from the last two historical contributors, the field of psychology would 
likely not be what it is today without influences from the field of theology. Many of the concepts 
described above were often seated within a Christian or theological frame, but advanced the 
thinking of secular philosophers and psychologists for many centuries to follow. On this same 
note, it is oft overlooked that the term “psychology” is derived from the word “psyche,” which 
meant “spirit” or “soul” in traditional Greek (Haubrich, 2003). Taken together with the suffix 
“ology,” psychology would therefore be the “study of the soul.” In similar derivations, the word 
“psychiatry,” which would mean “healing of the soul,” or “psychologist,” to connote an 
“attendant to the soul” (Haubrich, 2003). 
Continuing with historical influences, John Locke’s efforts should be briefly highlighted. 
With ideas clearly influenced by Aristotle and Plato, John Locke popularized the concept of 
“tabula rasa” or “blank slate.” This suggested that when we are born, our minds are void of  
pre-determined material, but are quickly inscribed with sensory experiences and their related 
memories (Locke, 2009). Rene Descartes advanced thinking related to “mind-body dualism” 
which proposed that our mind, or soul, is distinctly separate from the body, and can be 
influenced by divine intervention (Descartes, 2009). 
Søren Kierkegaard, often considered to be one of the first existentialist philosophers, 
spoke directly about some of the problems of objectivity and truth. He strongly believed that 
truth was something to be found within subjective experiences and personal knowledge. In 
Kierkegaard’s work, this was often connected to the role of faith and one’s spiritual truth 
(Kierkegaard, 2009). In other works, Kierkegaard spoke of the roles of choice, freedom, and 
anxiety upon the human experience (Bretall, 1946).  




From Kierkegaard’s writings we can clearly see that debates surrounding objectivity and 
subjectivity have existed for a very long time, reiterating the presence of “looping effects” 
(Hacking, 2002; Smith, 2010). Looping effects are exemplified by those circumstances through 
which bodies of knowledge are re-discovered by individuals, which can then lead to a 
transformative experience for the person doing the discovering. It is not that the individual 
created the knowledge anew, but that they have taken in something new to them. This new 
experience can then be shaped by how this knowledge changes their views and interactions with 
the world. This pattern explains how scientists or researchers are often quick to suggest a new 
theory or idea has been discovered, when often their work likely existed in some form at some 
point in the past (Hacking, 2002; Smith, 2010).  
The following sections highlight major theorists that take the history of psychology 
through the end of the 19th century and into the 20th. Since this paper aimed to maintain a 
consistent appreciation of context, large scale cultural trends are covered briefly. Relevant 
narratives from the individual local cultures of the theorists discussed are also included to round 
out the perspective provided. 
Freud, Witmer, and the origins of psychotherapeutic practice.  Beginning a historical 
dialogue with Freud may be considered arbitrary in many ways, however, it denotes a place in 
time where a clear focus on the inner workings of the mind took hold of public imagination, and 
therefore solidified its place in history. This point also represents a moment in history when 
psychology as a research discipline began expanding its degree of practical application, and 
began assisting others more psychotherapeutically.  
Freud was born in Moravia in 1856 to a 40-year-old father and a 20-year-old mother. He 
also had two half-brothers who were closer to his mother’s age than his father’s, which added 




some confusion to his early upbringing. During his birth, Freud was born in a caul, which carried 
with it the cultural belief that the baby would become someone important or successful. On a 
later occasion, Freud’s mother was told by an older woman that “she had brought a great man 
into the world” (Demorest, 2005, p. 45). These cultural and somewhat superstitious beliefs likely 
influenced the way his mother viewed him, and the expectations she may have had for his future. 
Later in life, Freud recalled having seen his mother naked when he was an infant, and his 
subsequent sexual urges at this sight. It is likely the salience of this event stuck with Freud and 
played some role in the development of his theory of childhood sexual urges and the Oedipus 
complex (Demorest, 2005). These theories were introduced at a time in history when the 
mainstream society experienced a significant amount of sexual repression, and viewed his sexual 
theories with both disgust and intrigue. If it were not for society’s specific reception of these 
theories, it is possible Freud would not have become the influential figure he did (Benjamin, 
2007). 
 Freud’s life was also transformed by the birth of his younger brother, Julius, who 
interrupted the close relationship Freud had with his mother. Freud reflected on this time in his 
later writings, and remembered harboring ill wishes toward his brother. These wishes were given 
increased potency, from Freud’s perspective, when his brother passed away at 8 months old. The 
young Freud began experiencing guilt at the belief that his wishes had in some way contributed 
to his young brother’s death. In connecting these ideas to Freud’s theories, it seems plausible that 
significant events like this had shaped his views regarding infantile aggression and the 
importance of undesirable impulses in people’s psychological life (Demorest, 2005). 
 At a similar point in history, the field of psychotherapy was finding its footing through 
the work of a little known founder to the field, Lightner Witmer. Witmer was born in 




Philadelphia in 1867. He was of Swiss ancestry, and grew up in a family of five. He was the 
oldest of his parent’s three children. As Witmer was beginning his professional life in 
psychology, he spent a significant amount of time studying the experimental method, and even 
earned his doctorate studying under Wundt. At this point in time, Witmer was utilizing these 
experimental methods to study things like reaction times, psychophysics, and individual 
differences. It wasn’t long before he began to consider how psychology might be used more 
practically for the lay population (McReynolds, 1987). 
 In 1896, Witmer was approached by a teacher who inquired about whether he thought 
psychology might help one of her 14-year-old students who was having significant difficulty 
learning how to write. Witmer accepted the challenge and took it upon himself to assist. This 
became a notable moment in Witmer’s career, eventually leading him to establish one of the first 
psychology clinics. Witmer later wrote papers on the practical uses of psychology, and 
developed the term “clinical psychology,” which might not have come into widespread use 
without his influence (McReynolds, 1987). 
 During the course of his immensely impactful career, Witmer went on to help found the 
American Psychological Association, develop some of the first clinical psychology curricula, 
and have a major impact on the clinical treatment of children and adolescents. He also started 
one of the first journals on clinical psychology, “The Psychological Clinic.” At times, Witmer’s 
views conflicted with other prominent thinkers of the era. He disagreed with William James’s 
methods, believing them to be unscientific and numinous at times. He also eschewed many of 
Freud’s psychoanalytic ideas, and would often employ methods more consistent with 
behaviorism (McReynolds, 1987). 




 Despite his respect for the scientific method and its place in clinical psychology, he was 
open-minded about clinical psychology’s place in the professional world (McReynolds, 1987). 
He believed the new field he was helping to create was related to medicine, as well as closely 
connected to other disciplines like sociology and more pedagogical studies (Witmer, 1907). He 
also saw value in the use of psychological tests and measures, but felt that they alone were 
incapable of providing a full picture of a person’s experience. He strongly valued the role of the 
individual, eventually becoming skeptical of the use of statistics as a means of understanding 
people’s experiences. During the later part of his career, he grew to appreciate the role of the 
environment more and moved away from his earlier position which gave increased emphasis to 
hereditary factors and their contributions to psychological functioning (McReynolds, 1987). 
 From these brief biographical accounts, the origins of psychotherapeutic practice can be 
observed. Both of the men described above contributed in significantly different, but meaningful 
ways. Freud developed a new dynamic model for understanding pathological behavior and 
suffering, while Witmer stressed the notion that the experimental methods of the day could be 
used outside of the academic realm to better the lives of the lay population. Both pioneers had 
roots in the philosophical realm, with Witmer even becoming a member of the American 
Philosophical Society (McReynolds, 1987). Without the influences of these men, it is likely that 
clinical psychology, if it were still called that, would be significantly different than it is today.  
Watson, Skinner, and the behaviorist focus on objectivity. During the first couple 
decades of the 20th century, behaviorism began to have a more substantial impact on the field of 
psychology. Behaviorism was largely advanced by the observations of the research psychologist 
John Watson. This theory sought to change the focus from the complex inner workings of the 
mind and onto a person’s observable behaviors. Watson preferred his new behaviorism over 




psychoanalysis because it prioritized a strictly objective perspective. He believed it left little 
room for assumption or speculation regarding its explanations of behavior, and thought this was 
the direction the field of psychology ought to go (Watson, 1913).  
 Watson cherished the relationship between psychology and the natural sciences. He felt 
strongly that if it were going to survive as a respected discipline, psychology needed to adopt 
more objective scientific practice. Watson was dissatisfied with the degree to which 
psychoanalytic studies could be replicated, and felt that behaviorism offered an approach that 
leant itself to scientific inquiry. It is worth noting that Watson experienced difficulty practicing 
introspection and other psychoanalytic methods, and generally felt uncomfortable interacting 
frequently with human research participants. It appears to be no small coincidence that Watson 
directed his research toward animal subjects, and felt that the data collected from animals would 
transfer proficiently to conceptualizations of human behavior (Pickren & Rutherford, 2010). 
Watson’s ideas were well received by an early 20th century culture that was seeking 
specialists who were viewed with more authority on the subject matter they studied. 
Psychological testing was also being developed and finding its way into the knowledge of 
mainstream society. This accompanied Watson’s motivation toward a psychology field utilizing 
more objective data. While Watson already made a significant impact on the field of psychology 
at an early age, it is likely he would have contributed even more had it not been for his 
scandalous affair with one of his students, whom he later married. This relationship cost him his 
academic position, and eventually led him to a career in advertising (Pickren & Rutherford, 
2010).  
 Behaviorism’s rise to power didn’t decline with Watson’s retreat into the background of 
the psychological research community. B.F. Skinner began to have an impact on the thoughts of 




academics and mainstream culture. He was greatly influenced by Watson’s work though this 
may be due to the benefits behaviorism offered him on a more personal level. Skinner had just 
experienced failure in college while trying to be a successful writer. In order to explain this 
failure, he found that behaviorism provided a tolerable interpretation. Rather than having to 
explain his difficulty through some fault in his own abilities, Skinner could assert that it was his 
environment that was responsible for his failure as a writer (Demorest, 2005).   
 Skinner expanded upon the preexisting theories of classical conditioning by developing a 
concept called “operant conditioning.” This theory suggested that not only are people 
conditioned to act in a reflexive way by the environment, but that they also behave in certain 
ways based on the consequences of these actions. When a behavior is positively reinforced with 
a desired outcome, the behavior is more likely to be performed later. When an action ends in 
some form of punishment, it is less likely to be performed in the future (Skinner, 1935). Skinner 
(1971) was convinced by the strength of this idea and took a more extreme position on the matter 
in his book Beyond Freedom and Dignity. In this writing, he encourages people to accept that 
there is no such thing as free will or choice in life. Every decision, from the smallest to the most 
important, is predetermined by the many systems at work in people’s lives. Culture often 
manipulates some of the larger outcomes in human life and the events that take place throughout 
them (Skinner, 1971). 
 Carl Rogers, empathy, and a rejection of environmental power. As the 20th Century 
progressed, American culture was rapidly changing and began pushing for a perspective that 
offered understanding rather than criticism. The powerful anti-war movements of the 1960s 
created a motivated American sub-culture that wanted to be listened to rather than directed. Carl 
Rogers was aware of these societal complaints and formulated the idea that people need the 




opportunity to be heard, empathized with, and regarded with great positivity no matter what they 
might have to share. He felt that some of the pain people experience is brought on by a coercive 
demand to meet cultural norms and values. Rogers concluded that mental health might be 
achieved through opportunities to embrace one’s own individuality, creativity, and autonomy. He 
felt strongly that individuals have all the wisdom they need to experience personal health, and 
that therapy might be more effective if advice giving were removed from it (Pickren & 
Rutherford, 2010). 
 Rogers grew up in a family that observed strict religious values, eventually leading to 
fundamentalist practice. He later recalled having no doubts that his parents loved him but felt 
certain they would be judgmental toward him if he behaved in ways that were considered taboo. 
Rogers also reflected on the frequency of the teasing he received from his siblings, and he felt 
that this had a corrosive effect on his relationships with them. This led Rogers to have a very 
private inner life from an early age because he did not want to be judged by his parents or 
chastised by his siblings. This caused a young Rogers to feel as though his deeply personal self 
was only regarded positively when he fit within particular familial norms (Demorest, 2005). It 
may be no surprise then that he later prioritized “unconditional positive regard” as one of the 
qualities he saw as essential to effective psychotherapy. Based on a familial history that includes 
these kinds of interactions, it is also not surprising that Rogers began to see a person’s 
environment as something that can inhibit individuality, autonomy, and overall mental health 
(Rogers, 1946). 
Aaron Beck and the cognitive revolution.  Cognitive psychology began to take shape as 
a formal domain of interest in the late 1960s. Ulric Neisser proposed that the human mind works 
similarly to a computer. As individuals live their lives and experience events, their minds are 




constantly taking in information, storing it, and retrieving it later on when useful (Neisser, 1967). 
Richard Lazarus theorized that appraisal plays a significant role in people’s ability to tolerate 
stress. He recognized that when people are able to develop optimistic appraisals of the difficult 
situations they face, they are more likely to experience a lower level of stress and view the 
situation as less threatening (Smith & Lazarus, 2001). 
 As cognitive psychology developed, it lent itself more readily to therapeutic use. As a 
pioneer in this work, Aaron Beck formalized the modality of Cognitive Therapy and 
hypothesized that as people grow and develop they create sets of “schemata” that are based on 
their past experiences. These schemata are believed to be socially constructed and serve as rules 
that govern how a person understands their life and the world around them. Beck observed that 
people with mental illness tend to utilize maladaptive thinking styles in regard to what he called 
the “Cognitive Triad.” The cognitive triad includes peoples’ core beliefs regarding themselves, 
other people, and the outside world. Beck saw core beliefs as deep schematic structures that 
influence the shallower levels of processing taking place in the form of people’s “underlying 
assumptions” and “automatic thoughts” (Beck, Rush, & Shaw, 1979).  
 Beck suggested that the treatment of mental illness ought to involve assisting clients in a 
process of “cognitive restructuring.” He found that if clients can begin engaging in more 
reflective thought, they may be able to challenge some of the maladaptive or distorted thinking 
that they are inclined to use. As this takes place it should ultimately lead to a reduction in their 
level of pathological symptoms (Beck & Clark, 1997). 
  Since its roots in the 1960s, cognitive psychology has undergone a variety of changes in 
how it has conceptualized mental health and the operations of the mind. Some recent theorists 
have placed the roots of social constructionism, or constructivism more broadly, in the cognitive 




tradition (Mahoney, 1991). To locate social constructionist theory in the cognitive tradition, one 
might observe the advancement from modernist to post-modernist thinking through their 
ontological beliefs. Early cognitive theory might have been more modernist, as it sought to 
measure processes of the mind like reaction times, memory (Miller, 1956), or symptom levels. 
This data would then be utilized to form an objective understanding of how the mind works. 
Cognitive psychology would have branched into post-modernism when it deviated from such 
objectivity, instead valuing the constructive nature of reality, the narrative value of schemata and 
the cultural differences inherent in creating meaning (Mahoney, 1991).   
 Now that the broader historical, cultural, and theoretical landscape has been described, a 
narrower focus is necessary to explore the roots of diagnosis and depression. The following 
narrative begins again in antiquity, this time exploring a different set of profound thinkers, and 
their work as related to the topic being discussed. 
History of Depression 
 We have distilled our modern-day understanding of “depression” from a uniquely 
multifaceted historical context, with diagnostic classification ebbing and flowing over time. 
“Melancholia” was one of the precursors to today’s depression. To understand the term in its 
most literal sense, we must briefly examine the ancient theory of “humorism.” This perspective 
was largely developed by the Greek physician Hippocrates, who is often considered to be the 
father of medicine. According to humorism, the body consists of four primary humors which are 
said to impact a person’s well-being: (a) yellow bile, (b) black bile, (c) phlegm, and (d) blood. Of 
primary importance to this discussion is the black bile humor, or in the Greek “melaina chole” 
(Bell, 2014; Berrios, 1988; Drabkin, 1955; Hippocrates & Schiefsky, 2005; Richet, 1910; 
Stelmack & Stalikas, 1991).   




 It is from the theory and tradition of humorism that the term melancholia predominantly 
originates. A humoristic conceptualization of the illness would suggest that the suffering 
individual had an excess of black bile resulting in the presenting painful disposition (Hippocrates 
& Schiefsky, 2005; Stelmack & Stalikas, 1991). The philosophical nature of the illnesses’ 
proposed etiology is also noteworthy. The idea of physiological chemicals leading to 
psychological distress draws some interesting parallels to our modern naturalist understanding of 
mental illness. At the same time, the four humors were often said to be related to the four 
planetary elements: (a) earth, (b) fire, (c) water and (d) air (Bell, 2014; Hippocrates & Shiefsky, 
2005; Stelmack & Stalikas, 1991).  
The cosmological view, including the four planetary elements, dates back to the Greek 
philosopher Empedocles and the Pythagoreans. They determined that the number four could be 
found in many areas of meaningful human life. They considered the four seasons, four qualities 
of the four primary elements, and an overall conception of the “harmony of life” as being 
connected to these numbers (Stelmack & Stalikas, 1991). This cosmological view supplemented 
the humorist perspective by connecting the importance of the chemicals in one’s body to one’s 
connection with nature, the earth, and the surrounding planets in our galaxy (Stelmack & 
Stalikas, 1991).  
 In this sense, the humorist understanding of illness began to stray from the scientific 
realist perspective and began to cling to a naturalist philosophical understanding. It is not hard to 
observe the connections between this train of thought and the religious or cosmological beliefs of 
Hippocrates’s time (Bell, 2014). Much of the Greek humorism developed in tandem with an 
ancient culture that both sought an objective understanding of the world, while also seeking 
answers from the celestial skies above. These parallels remind us that, just as in today’s modern 




society, medical and/or psychological practice develops in close relationship to the prevailing 
culture and cannot help but be at least indirectly influenced by it. 
  Discussion of the history of melancholia would not be complete without some mention 
of the premiere Roman physician Galen, and his study of the transformation of illnesses over 
time. Galen’s impressive historical reputation is supported by his accreditation of having written 
more medical texts than any other physician in antiquity. Galen was also an ardent follower of 
Hippocratic medicinal practice, and he became so intricately connected to much of Hippocrates’s 
work that professionals down through the ages have begun seeing both theorists’ work as part of 
the same canon. While he considered himself to be a preeminent interpreter of much of 
Hippocrates’s work, Galen also expanded upon the research and experimentation that had come 
before him (Bell, 2014).   
Galen advanced much of the early system of classification, which grew to include 
illnesses like “phrenitis” and “lethargus,” which were thought to be primarily mental in nature 
but included fever as a predominate symptom. This fever would be observed in combination with 
significant “excitement” in the case of phrenitis, or depression in the case of lethargus. These 
illnesses were believed to be separate from existing ideas of mania and melancholia which were 
thought to exist more chronically, and without the presence of fevers (Drabkin, 1955.) Galen also 
developed the notion that the four humors were connected to four psychological character types. 
The black bile humor was representative of a melancholy type that was thought to be pervasive 
and long-lasting in the lives of those suffering with it (Bell, 2014; Drabkin, 1955; Stelmack & 
Stalikas, 1991). These kinds of classificatory subtleties seem to have led to a new understanding 
of psychological experiences, while potentially adding some diagnostic confusion to the extant 
understanding of individual suffering. 




These kinds of differential diagnostic puzzles can be seen as precursors to the rampant 
diffusion that later impacted both melancholia and depression. With the subtle change to a 
language of character types, the idea of melancholia invited comment and discussion from those 
outside the field of medicine. In the years that followed, writers, politicians, ethicists and lay 
people began speaking of being melancholy. This took the relatively professional and scholarly 
concept of melancholia and transformed it into a broad cultural expression of feeling, 
melancholy. As the term left its academic holdings, it lost not only the precision, but its previous 
power (Bell, 2014). 
 Physicians of later centuries could no longer discuss melancholia without some influx of 
lay societal understanding. Melancholia began to mean a variety of different things, even to the 
physicians who continued to use it. Once the idea of being melancholy had pervaded the broad 
vocabulary of western civilization, it left many of its theoretical underpinnings behind. This 
disconnection from theory usurped the professional power from the everyday physician. As this 
took place, the physician could not assert (to the same extent) his authority as a holder of 
professional knowledge, because the world at large had adopted the term and made it its own. 
Research and experimental theory provided an edifice of authority for those in medicine to stand 
upon and this no longer existed when melancholia and/or melancholy became topics of everyday 
discussion or “reality constructing” (Bell, 2014). This kind of linguistic power and 
transformation is discussed again in later sections of this paper.  
 As the centuries passed, the term melancholia continued to take on new meanings. Prior 
to the 19th century, it remained a comparatively broad term, and its detection was based 
primarily upon its behavioral features, principally a decrease in behavioral output. It was also 
thought to be a subtype of mania, including symptoms like agitation, hallucination, paranoia, and 




dementia (Berrios, 1988). In the earlier part of the 19th century, many physicians associated the 
term melancholia with a sort of general “madness” (Prichard, 1835).  While some relationship 
between mania and melancholia was posited, the two were not believed to be polar opposites as 
depression and mania may be viewed today. States of sadness or depression could sometimes be 
found amongst the highly varied amalgam of symptoms contributing to melancholia, but they 
were not typically seen as the essential features of the illness until the latter portion of the 
century and the further development of diagnostic classification (Berrios, 1988). 
 One significant historical antecedent to modern depression and our current understanding 
of the term melancholia can be found within the advent of another term called “lypemania.” 
Although its use was predominantly limited to the countries of Spain and France, the clinical 
understanding of lypemania began to move 19th century understandings of melancholia towards 
what they are today. The expression lypemania was invented by Jean-Ètienne Dominique 
Esquirol (1820), who suggested that lypemania was an illness presenting with delusions, but also 
with “sadness which is often debilitating and overwhelming” (pp. 151-152). Esquirol further 
went on to suggest that it was a form of suffering distinct from mania and dementia (Esquirol, 
1820). This delineation seems to have begun pushing 19th century European physicians toward a 
more precise belief about what constituted melancholia, and eventually depression. The term did 
not last, however, as many practitioners in other parts of the industrialized world continued to 
prefer melancholia over the newer lypemania. This seems to have been partially due to the 
tendency at the time to frequently use both terms interchangeably. As this happened, the more 
longstanding melancholia outlasted the comparatively young lypemania, which eventually fell by 
the wayside of technical use (Berrios, 1988). 




 As the beginning of the 20th century drew nearer, the term depression was utilized more 
frequently, though a consistent understanding of what it meant remained unclear. In some cases, 
the terms depression and melancholia were both used by the same physician, or otherwise used 
interchangeably (Berrios, 1988). During the earlier portion of his career, Freud described a 
“periodic depression,” which he believed to be a particular kind of “anxious neurosis.” This 
illness could last for many months and involved a chronic period of anxiety attacks. He added 
that this kind of ailment tended to have a distinct connection to a “psychical trauma” (Freud, 
1893). As these kinds of descriptors suggest, Freud believed this kind of depression to fit more 
closely with what might today be considered an anxiety disorder. 
 While highlighting this specific form of mental distress, he concurrently spoke of 
melancholia or “melancholia proper.” According to Freud (1917), this illness contained 
symptoms such as: feelings of worthlessness, loss of interest in things, difficulty sleeping, and 
loss of appetite. He also noted that someone experiencing melancholia would have a significant 
loss of self-respect (Freud, 1917). These kinds of symptoms closely resemble the diagnostic 
criteria typically associated with depression, or more specifically, major depressive disorder 
(APA, 2013). Freud’s use of both terms points to some of the ambiguity that existed in the late 
19th century to the beginning of the 20th century. While he utilized a form of depression in his 
diagnostic classification, it meant something different than how we understand it today. 
Melancholia began to be understood as akin to modern day depression, but it was harbored in a 
different linguistic frame. 
 Surprisingly, the term depression would not reach greater widespread clinical use until 
the 1950s and 1960s. During this period of time, the first “antidepressants” were developed. 
Some scholars suggest that the diagnosis of depression may have come from the idea that those 




who benefitted from antidepressants could subsequently be described as depressed. 
Electroconvulsive therapy began to be used prior to the 1950s and 1960s, however, this 
procedure did not specifically label patients as depressed (Hirshbein, 2006). The diagnosis of 
depression was not listed in the first edition of the DSM (1952) and would not make its formal 
classificatory debut until DSM- III (APA, 1980).  
The term depression had been used in more minor descriptive ways in the first two 
editions of the DSM, but it was not officially thought about as its own category of illness. In 
DSM-I, experiences consistent with a depression or melancholia were placed under one of three 
categories of psychotic disorders. In these cases, the disorder was believed to be primarily 
affective in nature, separating it from the “Schizophrenic” or “Paranoid” types (APA, 1952,  
p. 12). It was thought that sufferers would, at times, also have difficulties with reality testing, 
sometimes experiencing hallucinations or delusions as a part of their illness.  
More broadly speaking, it was believed that depressive-like symptoms arose as a defense 
mechanism for managing an onset of anxiety (APA, 1952; Horwitz, Wakefield, &  
Lorenzo-Luaces, 2017). Much of this initial DSM conceptualization can be understood when 
taken in light of the prevailing theory and practice in the 1950s. Psychodynamic theory was 
dominating the clinical landscape, and many mental illnesses were considered against a frame of 
defense mechanisms and unconscious anxieties that were responsible for producing symptoms 
(Horwitz et al., 2017). 
 DSM-II continued to view depression as an experience categorized under and in 
connection to anxiety disorders. It spoke frequently of the role of “neuroses” and the belief that 
anxiety was the central feature of these disorders (APA, 1968). During the 1970s, debate and 
research intensified around the possibility that depressive disorders could exist as distinctly 




separate from anxiety or psychosis. In response to this increase in debate, and despite a relative 
lack of evidence at the time, a new category was added. This change gave depressive disorders 
their own category in the DSM-III (APA, 1980; Horwitz et al., 2017).       
In the current era, antidepressant medications often dominate the psychiatric landscape 
and represent a major biochemical intervention for the treatment of depression (Pratt et al., 
2011). Much of the emphasis on the use of antidepressant medications is advanced by the 
medical model which suggests that there are distinct biological underpinnings for psychiatric 
disorders. This perspective is largely founded upon finding physiological brain pathways that are 
responsible for the depressive symptoms we observe (Callahan & Berrios, 2005). It also 
attributes depressive symptomology to a lack of neurotransmitters and/or the idea that a chemical 
imbalance is to blame for this kind of human suffering. The “Chemical Imbalance Theory” of 
depression originated around the same time as the advent of antidepressant medication and has 
remained a part of popular practice ever since (Callahan & Berrios, 2005).  
 Psychiatric practitioners continue to pursue findings consistent with this epistemology, 
despite a continuing lack of agreement regarding a specific biological pathway in the brain 
responsible for the symptoms of depression. Though there appears to be a lack of scientific 
evidence supporting the Chemical Imbalance Theory of depression, antidepressant medications 
continue to be widely proscribed. This may be partly due to the fact that, for many people, they 
produce a desirable reduction of symptoms (Callahan & Berrios, 2005).  
Key Concepts 
 Mental disorder. In order to understand what traditional diagnosis looks like in the 
mental health field, it may be necessary to examine some of the core components needed for a 
mental disorder to be present. According to the American Psychiatric Association (2013), the 




DSM-5 states that, “A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant 
disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a 
dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental 
functioning” (p. 20). As stated by this definition of a mental disorder, dysfunction exists within 
an individual. 
 Despite the widespread use of the DSM as a clinical tool, and its laborious construction 
and development by the American Psychiatric Association (2013), much controversy remains 
regarding the mental disorders it describes (Demazeux & Singy, 2015; Ghaemi, 2014; Miller, 
Wolf, & Keane, 2014; Wakefield, 2013). Some of this controversy is concerned with the 
scientific underpinnings said to inform the DSM-5. The American Psychiatric Association 
(2013) has suggested that each mental disorder should have objective criteria which determine its 
presence within individuals. Statistical measures have been used to assign validity to the 
disorders and emphasize the importance of being able to detect the same disorder among many 
individuals who may be experiencing similar symptoms (APA, 2013). 
As strong scientific validity is appended to mental disorders, the hope may be that they 
become viewed similarly to various medical diagnoses (Ghaemi, 2014). This style of scientific 
methodology stems from a post-positivist and/or modernist stance which claims that the world 
and the observer of the world can be separate. The primary notion is that as scientific empiricists 
engage with and observe the world, they can find objective truths that exist therein. Through 
careful scientific deliberation, the world can be understood as it is, and the actions of the 
observer will have little to no effect upon it (Creswell, 2007; Gergen, 2002; Gergen, 2009). The 
post-positivist approach often acts in a reductionistic fashion, seeking to take broad theoretical 




concepts and break them into their narrower component parts as a means of better understanding 
their functionality (Creswell, 2007).  
As previously mentioned in this paper, mental disorders are often believed to exist within 
individuals. This idea also has modernist roots and is maintained by the assumption that 
individual knowledge is essential for understanding psychological processes. Each individual is 
believed capable of rational, truth-bearing thought, which may be impeded by various kinds of 
mental dysfunction. As a person experiences dysfunction, they become less able to maintain 
objective truths about the world. The modernist view continues that language is used to 
communicate the rationality and truth each individual holds which may be scrutinized against the 
truths held by others’ individual knowledge (Gergen, 2001). 
 Social constructionism. Social constructionism is a postmodern perspective within the 
field of psychology that rejects many of the previously held modernist views. It challenges the 
notion that individual knowledge exists, and that the external world is observable by individuals 
seeking to discern truth. Instead, it proposes that knowledge is shared between individuals in 
relationship with one another (Gergen, 2001; Gergen, 2009; Gergen et al., 2004). Much social 
construction takes place through a process called co-action, or coordinated action. As a person 
shares their thoughts or feelings with another person, a reaction of some sort is called for, and 
this reaction will continue to construct, for the other, how they understand the relationship. This 
process extends far beyond the relationship, however, and these patterns shape how we conceive 
of our world, and the subjective realities within (Gergen, 2009).   
When two people are involved in a thoughtful discourse, they share meaning which is 
thought to be derived largely from culture and tradition. As each individual develops and grows, 
they learn the traditions of their local culture. During their lifetime, most individuals will meet 




many people from different local cultures who hold a different understanding of reality. Upon 
this meeting, they may share their differing realities and through such processes, each 
individual’s understanding of the world is shaped and reconstructed. In this sense, social 
constructionism offers a very relational view toward understanding psychological phenomena 
(Gergen, 2007; Gergen, 2009). 
From the social constructionist vantage point, language is the primary vehicle through 
which culture and knowledge are shared. As we grow and develop as individuals, we learn how 
to use language in a way that is consistent with the cultural values of the society we are from. In 
order to interact with others around us, who may also meet some of our most basic needs, we 
must learn to socialize in a way that will be valued. A person may choose to reject the cultural 
language values of the society they are from, but it is likely this will result in a decreased ability 
to cooperatively communicate knowledge and understanding with those around them (Gergen, 
2009). For example, if an individual decides to discard their family conventions around language 
and begins describing the world in a way contrary to preferred understandings, communicative 
collaboration with family members may become strained. This may be seen in deeply political 
families, where one member chooses to adopt strong beliefs that run contrary to the political 
values of the family majority. As these patterns continue, interaction may become less fulfilling 
and the individual may find their family culture less nurturing and accepting (Gergen, 2009). 
 More broadly speaking, these communication difficulties can result in social justice 
issues. As the modernist view of clinical diagnosis has become the dominant view in American 
culture, other perspectives may be deemed unscientific, or inferior. This sets up the foundation 
for a clinical system in which the providers of “truth,” the psychological scientists, determine 
what is “reality,” while lay people are subjected to this view whether it resonates with their 




personal subjective reality or not. This process may lead to the marginalization of those said to 
be lacking, or “abnormal,” within the dominant view (Gergen, Hoffman, & Anderson, 1996; 
Gergen et al., 2004). 
 As the powerful voice of the media spreads the dominant cultural knowledge of mental 
disorders, individuals may see themselves as possessing some form of deficiency. This 
mechanism may create a cycle in which lay people see themselves as lacking, with clinical 
providers being the only ones capable of repairing what is broken (Gergen et al., 1996). As this 
takes place, the dominant voice within society gains a significant amount of public control, while 
other societal voices are forced to relinquish the control they once had (Gergen et al., 2004). 
 Pragmatism is another major concept that supports the social constructionist perspective. 
As ideas of objective truth and accuracy are rejected, the value in different perspectives is 
derived not from the extent to which they represent one universal reality, but to the extent with 
which they have utility within a shared subjective reality (Gergen, 1994; Gergen, 2009; James 
1907). For example, in the United States we have laws which instruct legal driving practices. 
Traffic lights direct us when to stop and when to proceed. Traffic lights do not reflect a universal 
reality about how driving is to be done best, but function within a cultural system that gives them 
purposeful utility. They serve to organize cars on the road, and as people share the socially 
constructed reality that traffic lights are necessary, a sense of order can be experienced while 
driving.  
 Diagnosis, as understood by the DSM, does meet some pragmatic ends. This can be seen 
in the efficient manner by which providers are sometimes able to use commonly understood 
diagnoses to conceptualize client cases for other professionals. Diagnoses can also be used for 
effective communication with insurance companies, who look to reimburse providers for their 




services (APA, 2013; Ghaemi, 2014). The problem may not be that mainstream constructions of 
diagnosis lack utility, but that they may end up providing their utility to those with the most 
power within the mental health services field. If treatment is to be most beneficial for the clients 
receiving it, it seems essential that their conceptions of the dysfunction they are experiencing be 
given increased volume (Gergen et al., 2004). 
Application to Clinical Psychology 
 If the field of psychology is going to adopt a new understanding of diagnosis, it will be 
important for student clinicians be exposed to it. Theoretical models for clinical practice have 
grown, developed, and fallen out of mainstream practice since the beginning of psychotherapy as 
an established treatment. As this process takes place, student clinicians are trained and 
scrutinized for their ability to replicate a desired treatment model. In today’s mental health 
training programs, there may be a lack of emphasis on the role of context in mental health 
treatment. Although many programs are discussing the role of context to some degree, this 
discussion is often relegated to a single class where it may not be a primary focus (Peterson, 
Vincent, & Fechter-Leggett, 2013). 
 As previously mentioned, personal knowledge and meaning are thought to be derived 
from the relationships people have with each other (Gergen, 2001; Gergen, 2009; Gergen et al., 
2004). This means that in order to fully understand the clients we serve, it is essential that we 
understand the contexts from which they come. As this type of material is given priority 
throughout clinical training programs, student clinicians may also develop a respect for the 
subjectivity of knowledge. This may lead to a beneficial breakdown in the detrimental social 
hierarchy that has existed between the scientific community and those outside of it (Gergen, 
1994; Gergen, 2002). As student clinicians become comfortable with the idea that all knowledge 




is situated within a specific context, they may be less inclined to assert dominant mainstream 
views regarding diagnosis. This may empower the voices of the clients they serve and create 
restorative discourses in which clients can feel as though they have control over the treatment 
they receive, and the outcomes they can expect (Bohan, 1990). 
 Intersection with social justice. The concerns with our current diagnostic and 
epistemological trajectory relate to issues of social justice in the sense that they may create a 
detrimental hierarchy between different societal groups. Stated earlier were the notions that the 
modernist scientific establishment has produced views deemed to be objective realities of what 
is, with alternative views often being considered inferior (Gergen et al., 1996; Gergen et al., 
2004). The current mainstream system of diagnosis was also described as providing a deficit 
model for understanding clients’ presenting problems. This may create a cultural atmosphere in 
which lay people begin to see themselves as lacking, while treatment providers are seen as 
necessary for helping them to overcome their shortfalls (Gergen et al., 1996). 
 These can also be considered issues of social justice because they give volume to the 
voices of one population within society, while simultaneously silencing the voices of many 
others. Language is the vehicle by which this happens. The mental health field has adopted a 
pattern of “technologizing” (Gergen, 1994) terminology. This happens when terms such as 
sadness, depression, and anxiety are taken in by social scientists and made into technical 
concepts that are observed through experimentation and scientific inquiry. Once this happens, 
these concepts are assumed to be correctly understood by the scientists who have researched 
them, and only marginally understood by lay people who have not. In this way, language is used 
to differentiate between members of society who are believed to be informed, and those who are 




not. This process may result in facilitating social hierarchy and potentiating oppression (Gergen, 
1994).  
 The social constructionist perspective might suggest that increased importance be placed 
on the open dialogues shared between clients and clinicians. This may allow for a restorative 
atmosphere of polyvocality, in which individuals can explore a variety of constructions through 
which they can understand their difficulties. As a plethora of constructions are considered, the 
range of solutions increases (Gergen, 2009). Rather than suggesting that people suffer from 
illnesses like depression that involve a chemical imbalance which can only be treated through 
lifelong medication use (Leventhal & Antonuccio, 2009), clients can begin to entertain the idea 
that there may be a variety of effective ways to alleviate the pain they are experiencing. In this 
fashion, social constructionist dialogues likely offer clients a considerable amount of hope for the 
future. 
As I transition from a review of past literature to an examination of the new research that 
was conducted, a couple of underlying questions are asked. First, “Is a predominately modernist 
theoretical orientation sufficient for bringing psychotherapeutic practice deep in the 21st 
century?” and secondly, “What might modern day psychotherapy gain from adopting a wider 
contextual lens toward our understanding of mental illness?” In attempting to derive some 
answers to these questions, an online survey was utilized that asked participants about their 
theoretical views. It compared these views with participants’ beliefs about diagnosis, depression, 










 This study involved the use of an online survey to assess the theoretical beliefs of clinical 
and counseling psychology doctoral students. It also examined the views held by clinical 
psychologists who are currently practicing in the field, or who have practiced at some point 
during their careers. Specifically, the administered survey sought to assess these individuals’ 
views regarding diagnosis, and the clinical benefits they perceive to be derived from the use of 
diagnosis. It also attempted to gather information about participants’ conceptions of the 
diagnosis of depression and gave particular attention to their etiological and epistemological 
understandings of these kinds of illnesses. Additionally, it sought to discover participants’ views 
about the diagnosis of depression as an objective or subjective construct. These views may 
inform whether or not major depressive disorder is viewed as an easily measurable phenomenon, 
or one that may exist outside the realm of quantification. The present study further attempted to 
understand whether participants view depression as something experienced in gradations by most 
people, or whether it is conceptualized as a unique experience for a minority of the population. 
Participants 
 I recruited potential participants for the study by sending an email to graduate psychology 
program directors, asking that they forward an invitation for participation to students and clinical 
psychology faculty. The students were graduate students in either clinical or counseling 
psychology programs who had begun seeing clients through clinical training experiences. The 
faculty participants had either their PhD or PsyD, but also needed to have practiced clinically at 
some point during their careers. The invitation included a link to the study survey so participants 
were able to access the questionnaire as easily as possible. In hopes of increasing participation 




rates, program directors were asked to respond regarding their willingness to forward the survey 
request to members of their programs. This allowed for greater awareness of the number of 
potential participants.  
 The present study utilized a snowball sampling methodology for gathering participants. 
The study survey was sent via email to doctoral-level clinical psychologists with whom I am 
acquainted from my own clinical experience. As a part of this email, these psychologists were 
asked to participate in the survey and forward the email to other clinical psychologists known to 
them. Following this style of research methodology, the study survey made its way to a larger 
number of experienced doctoral-level participants. 
 In addition to seeking participants from these specific groups, I also sent my survey 
recruitment letter and link to psychologists and doctoral-level trainees connected to various 
professional organizations, such as APA and the NCSPP (National Council of Schools and 
Programs of Professional Psychology). Various college counseling centers across the country 
were also contacted for recruitment and participation. 
 All study participants had the option to enter a drawing to win a $50 Amazon.com gift 
card after successful completion of the survey. For those participants interested, an additional 
and separate entry form was presented. This form asked these participants for contact 
information, and automatically entered them into the drawing. As a part of this process, 
confidentiality was maintained, and participants were not required to provide their names. This 
separate drawing entry form was not attached to survey responses which helped to ensure that 
questionnaire responses were kept confidential. This plan was designed to recruit participants 
from the population being sampled. 
 





 An online survey was utilized for data collection as a part of this study. During the 
process of survey development, licensed clinical psychologists, doctoral students in the field of 
clinical psychology, and clinical psychology faculty were consulted. The measure was made up 
of 45 total questions from six separate question categories. Fifteen of these questions covered 
participant demographic information and theoretical background. Four questions examined 
participants’ views about the factors that contribute to our understanding of depression. Nine 
questions addressed participants’ conceptions of the diagnosis of depression, including their 
beliefs regarding its etiology and their views about its existence as an objective or subjective 
phenomenon. 
  An additional eight questions inquired about participants’ views surrounding clinical 
diagnosis. These questions specifically sought to examine their views regarding its utility, both 
in terms of professional communication with those in the mental health related fields, and as a 
part of therapeutic interactions with clients. Four further questions asked about people’s views in 
terms of the medical model, which is the dominate model of treatment in the United States. 
Finally, five questions explored participants’ professional practice, and their experience using 
diagnosis. This section also briefly examined participants’ experience treating the diagnosis of 
depression. The survey questions were asked through the use of Likert-type response choices 
(See Appendix C for survey items).  
Procedure 
 In order to begin the data gathering process, a request for research participation was 
emailed to program directors both in clinical psychology and counseling psychology doctoral 
programs. A similarly crafted email was sent to the clinical psychologists that I have come in 




contact with during my pre-doctoral practicum experiences. This same process was followed 
when contacting directors of college counseling centers and psychologists associated with 
professional organizations. Program directors and other psychologists willing to forward the 
participation request received further information about the study, and a link to the electronic 
measure. The measure was hosted by SurveyMonkey.com. Participants who opted to be involved 
in the study were directed to a webpage describing and requesting their informed consent. As a 
part of this page, participants learned about the goals of the present study and were informed of 
any possible benefits and risks of participating. Those willing to provide their informed consent 
were guided to the first page of the survey. In total, the survey should have taken approximately 
15 to 20 minutes to complete. Survey responses remained anonymous and confidential 
throughout the duration of data collection and analysis. Data was gathered for several weeks, 
until the desired number of participants was reached. Later analysis was conducted using the 
SPSS statistical analysis program. 
Statistical Analysis 
 A working hypothesis for this study was that therapists from particular theoretical 
backgrounds would have tendencies to view depression as more or less socially constructed 
(Hypothesis 1a). Those who viewed depression as a more socially constructed phenomenon 
would also view it as a less useful diagnosis than those therapists who view it as a more objective 
biological illness (Hypothesis 1b). As depression was believed to be more closely akin to a 
medical illness, it would be increasingly viewed as a vital component in understanding the 
client’s symptoms. The more depression was understood as a socially constructed concept, the 
less valuable the diagnosis may become as it represents one subjective view among many for 
describing human experience. The null hypothesis within this proposition was that there is no 




relationship between a person’s theoretical understanding of diagnosis and their views of it as 
useful.  
 Analysis of variance, correlational statistics, and paired samples t-tests were utilized for 
examining Hypothesis 1a and 1b. This involved assessing possible relationships between 
participants’ views of depression as more social constructed, view of diagnosis as useful, and 
their theoretical model of choice. Statistical crosstabulations were examined for benefit through 
the large amount of data collected, while preliminarily identifying meaningful results. In this 
analysis, the independent variable was a person’s theoretical model of choice. The dependent 
variable was the person’s conceptualization of its usefulness, and their view of it as more socially 
constructed than biological. These questions represented working Hypothesis 1. 
 Another working hypothesis was that clinicians who tend to view diagnosis and 
depression through a more social constructionist lens would likely view the medical model as 
decreasingly helpful (Hypothesis 2). To test this hypothesis, crosstabulations were used to search 
through data more efficiently. Paired-samples t-tests were performed to discover the relationship 
between views of diagnosis as useful, the view of depression as more socially developed, and the 
view of the medical model as appropriate for psychological understanding. In these t-tests, the 
independent variable was a view of depression as more socially developed. Dependent variables 
were the view of diagnosis as useful, and the view of the medical model as preferable. 
 Through examination of interesting statistical frequencies, participants’ views were also 
compared to the diathesis stress model. These types of participants may view depression as an 
objective psychological illness but hold the perspective that it is approximately equal parts 
biological and social (Hypothesis 3). Comparison of these frequencies provided information 
about whether a diathesis-stress perspective remains a dominant context of clinical practice, or 




whether there is a significant variation in the degree to which clinicians adhere to this kind of 
model. 
 Statistical analysis involved the comparison of views between seasoned clinicians and 
clinician-in-training. This analysis offered insights into the impacts of having worked in the field 
of mental health for an extended period, compared to those who are relatively new to the field. 
These findings created further hypotheses about the impact of having attended graduate school in 
the more distant past versus currently engaging in this kind of study. This might provide 
indication of whether clinical graduate programs have begun offering students different 
perspectives toward mental health treatment than they might have in the past (Hypothesis 4). 
Analysis of these data involved the calculations of correlation coefficients to examine the 
relationship between seasoned clinicians and social views of depression, as well as a correlation 
coefficient looking at the relationship between clinicians-in-training and their views of diagnosis 
as socially constructed or useful. It also included the use of one-way analysis of variance 
comparisons to explore statistical significance of the data. 
 It was also informative to compare data frequencies between the demographic 
information collected, and the individual questions asked. For example, did clinicians from 
particular parts of the country tend to adhere to particular theoretical views more often than those 
from other parts of the country (Hypothesis 5a)? It was further interesting to compare the 
frequencies of participants from particular parts of the country and their views about the medical 
model (Hypothesis 5b). In concluding analysis of the data, other demographic areas were 
compared to survey questions with the hope of identifying interesting connections and 
relationships. 




Each of the questions developed for the survey had the potential to highlight interesting 
information about currently practicing clinicians, and their theoretical views towards diagnosis 
and the treatment of depression. This information provided introductory insights into clinicians’ 
views towards the medical model, and how they are utilizing tools such as the DSM, or 
diagnosis. Overall, this survey information supplied valuable information about the current 
epistemologies guiding practitioners in the modern era. These findings told us something about 
our relationship to past understandings of diagnosis and depression, while informing us of what 
the future may hold for clinical practice. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Race and gender. The research sample included a total of 101 participants (N = 101) 
with 82 identifying as female (82%), 18 identifying as male (18%), and one participant 
identifying as gender non-binary (1%). Of these participants, 6% identified as Asian or Asian 
American; 8% identified as Black/African American; 8% identified as Latino/Hispanic, or 
Latinx; 81% identified as White; 6% identified as Bi-racial; and one participant identified their 
race or nationality as “international” (1%). Participants could select multiple racial or ethnic 
identities when completing the survey. 
Age, sexual orientation, and relationship status. The mean participant age was 33 
(SD= 10.9, N=100), with a maximum of 76, and a minimum of 22. Of peripheral interest, 75% 
of participants identified as heterosexual, 2% as gay, 5% as lesbian, 14% as bi-sexual, 3% as 
pansexual, and 1% as queer (N= 97). In reporting on their marital status, 23% of study 
participants indicated that they were currently single, 38% said they were in a committed 
relationship, 37% said they were married, and 2% said they were divorced (N=99). 




Educational experience, specialty track of training, and graduation. Participants were 
asked about their “Highest Degree Earned at Present” (N=100). Of this data it was found that 
14% had acquired their bachelors, 57% had acquired their masters, 10% had earned a PhD, and 
19% had earned their PsyD. One participant in the study had also acquired their JD. Participants 
were also asked about the “Highest Degree they were Anticipating.” About 20% of respondents 
reported that they were anticipating their PhD to be their highest degree, while the remaining 
80% felt that a PsyD would be the highest degree they earned. Six participants opted not to 
answer this question. Approximately 89% indicated attending clinical psychology programs, 
while 11% reported coming from counseling psychology programs. 
 For the purposes of conducting later comparisons, respondents were also asked whether 
they had come from specialty training tracks in psychology. About 23% of respondents reported 
a child specialty, 37% reported an adult specialty, 44% indicated a more generalist track, 11% 
endorsed a health specialty track, 7% reported a community track, 12% reported background 
training in neuropsychology, and 9% reported specialty training in forensic psychology. Some 
participants also expressed other areas of specialty training including specific areas like, College 
Counseling, Military, Latino/Bilingual, Couples and Families, and School Psychology. 
Participants could endorse multiple areas of specialty when completing the survey. 
Figure 1 displays the years that participants finished/were expecting to finish their 
doctoral programs (N=98). For people who have already graduated, this included a year in the 
past, while for current trainees it meant a year in the future. The majority of participants expected 
to graduate between the years 2018 and 2022. These participants made up approximately 72% of 
those surveyed. This also indicates that the majority of participants were likely still in training.
 Of the participants that were still in their graduate programs (N=72), approximately 7% 




were in their 1st year; 15% in their 2nd year; 21% in their 3rd year; 32% in their 4th year; 18% 
in their 5th year; and 7% in their 6th year. From the group of participants who had graduated in 
the past (N=28), about 93% were still practicing clinically in some capacity, while the other 7% 
had practiced at some point in the past. 
Theoretical orientation. Figure 2 displays participants identifications in terms of 
theoretical orientation. Participants could select multiple orientations to accommodate the reality 
that many, if not most clinicians, consider themselves to fit somewhere within a broader 
integrative category (Goodyear et al., 2016; Jaimes, Larose‐Hébert, & Moreau, 2015; Norcross 
& Prochaska, 1982).  
Hypothesis 1a 
 As a means of exploring relationships between participants’ theoretical orientations and 
their views of depression as social constructed (Hypthesis 1a), related survey questions were 
statistically analyzed in comparison to theoretical orientation data. For the purposes of analyzing 
this data, participants who indicated an adherence to multiple orientations were grouped as 
“integrative” while participants who indicated only one orientation were grouped as solely within 
that orientation category. Approximately 68% of participants identified as integrative, 16% as 
Cognitive-Behavioral (CBT), 11% as psychodynamic, 3% as behavioral, and 2% as humanistic 
(N=100). This pattern appears largely consistent with data from other research (Goodyear et al., 
2016).  
The first question examined was Question 2, “In the majority of cases, I find that the 
development of depression is due to the suffering constructed between people.” Analysis of 
variance showed no statistical significance between participant theoretical orientation and 
participant response to question 2 F(4, 93) = .695, p = .597. Question 3 (“In the majority of cases 




I find that the development of depression is defined by individual cultures”) was also compared 
to theoretical orientation, but similarly, did not show any statistical significance F(4, 93) = .874, 
p = .483.   
Question 12 (“my understanding of depression is significantly impacted by my cultural 
upbringing”) was also analyzed against the theoretical orientation data, but no significant mean 
differences were found with this comparison either F(4, 91) = 2.18, p = .077. Despite this lack of 
significance, a Tukey HSD post-hoc analysis was conducted to explore this lower p-value. As a 
part of this post-hoc analysis a statistically significant relationship between the psychodynamic 
and humanistic orientations was found when compared to question 12 (SD = .7), p = .044. While 
significant at the .05 level, this finding may represent an intriguing relationship. Problematically, 
the present study did not have enough participants identifying solely as psychodynamic or 
humanistic to give this lower p-value the meaning it might otherwise have. 
Finally, survey Question 13 (“my understanding of depression has been significantly 
shaped by my graduate school education”) was also compared with theoretical orientation, to 
examine whether significant differences would be found between orientation and the 
construction of clinician’s understanding of depression through graduate school. Again, no 
significant differences were found F(4, 91) = 1.37, p = .250. In sum, this means that for 
Hypothesis 1a, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and it must instead be concluded based on 
the current data, that there may not be any statistically significant relationship between 
theoretical orientation and one’s conception of depression as socially constructed.  
Although no statistical significances were found between these variables, it is interesting 
to note that across theoretical orientations, approximately 68% of participants agreed that 
“depression is due to the suffering constructed between people” (Question 2; SD = .86, M = 3.5). 




Nearly 69% of respondents also agreed that “depression is defined by individual cultures” 
(Question 3; SD = .91, M = 3.5). About 70% also agreed with the idea that “my understanding of 
depression is significantly impacted by my cultural upbringing” (Question 12; SD = .93, M = 
3.6). Finally, about 83% of participants believed that their understanding of depression was 
shaped by their “graduate school education” (Question 13; SD= .9, M = 4).  
Hypothesis 1b 
A statistical crosstabulation was used to explore meaningful correlational relationships 
between survey questions related to Hypothesis 1b. A significant positive correlation was found 
between the belief that “… depression is defined by individual cultures” (Question 3) and 
“diagnosis is useful… to create a story of client’s suffering” (Question 19), Pearson’s r(98) = 
.29, p = .004. While this represents a statistically weak correlation, a significant relationship 
between these variables might be considered somewhat intuitive. Survey results also revealed a 
weak positive relationship between the belief that “depression is defined by individual cultures” 
(Question 3) and that “diagnosis is useful for conceptualizing client cases” (Question 15),  
r(94) = .26, p = .01. This may mean that many clinicians recognize the impact of culture on the 
development of depression and they also see the value of clinical diagnosis for treatment 
purposes. About 69% of participants agreed and strongly agreed with the former question in this 
comparison (SD = .92, M = 3.6), while approximately 81% agreed and strongly agreed with the 
latter (SD = .93, M = 3.9). 
A weak-to-moderate positive correlation was found between participant views to the 
statements “my understanding of depression has been significantly shaped by my graduate 
school education” (Question 13) and “diagnosis is useful for easing communication between 
mental health professionals” (Question 14; r(94) = .40, p < .001). This finding is statistically 




significant and unlikely to be found due to chance. While correlational data do not provide a 
causal explanation, this relationship may make sense if clinicians are developing a shared 
understanding of depression in graduate school, and then using this for simplifying 
communications in clinical practice.   
A paired samples t-test was also used to explore relationships between Questions 2  
(“In the majority of cases, I find that the development of depression is due to the suffering 
constructed between people”) and Question 27 (“If I had the option I would prefer to assign 
people diagnoses”). Responses to these questions were found to be statistically significant, with 
scores to Question 2 (M = 3.57, SD = .85) being significantly higher than scores on Question 27 
(M = 2.5, SD = .97), t(93) = 7.3, p < .001, d = 0.76. This data also represents a medium to large 
effect size. 
Question 3 was also compared to Question 27 using a paired samples t-test, and 
significant differences were found in these data as well, with scores from Question 3 (M = 3.57, 
SD = .90) being significantly higher than scores to Question 27 (M = 2.5, SD = .97), t(93) = 8.9, 
p < .001, d = .92. This suggests that there is a meaningful relationship between participant beliefs 
in depression as a culturally defined concept and their low clinical desires to assign diagnoses. 
Overall, the majority of participants (69%) agreed with Question 3 and disagreed with question 
27 (59%). Interestingly, while participants largely believed that depression is defined by 
individual cultures (Question 3; M = 3.6, SD = .90), they also saw a benefit in using diagnoses 
for developing treatment interventions (Question 16; M = 4.0, SD = .83), t(93) = -3.26, p = .002, 
d = -0.38.   
 In sum, data from Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 1b reveal that while theoretical 
orientation does not seem to be a major factor influencing participant views of depression as 




socially constructed, participants across all theoretical orientations seemed to strongly endorse a 
social constructionist/post-modern perspective when thinking about depression. Much of this 
constructed narrative of depression seems to be acquired as trainees are in graduate school and 
are learning about how members of the clinical psychology field communicate about the illness. 
In assessing how this narrative is being used in clinical practice, the majority of clinicians 
seemed to feel that diagnosis has a worthwhile value for conceptualization but may not be a 
useful narrative to specifically assign to clients when meeting with them.  
Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2 analysis involved continuing to look at those questions relevant to 
conceptualizations of depression as socially constructed, while comparing them with the survey 
questions related to the medical model. A statistical crosstabulation was again used to begin 
exploring collected data to determine where significant relationships between questions existed. 
One unexpected finding was found in the relationship between Question 1 (M = 2.4, SD = .96; 
“In the majority of cases, I find that the development of depression is due to biological illness”) 
and Question 22 (M = 2.9, SD = 1.1; “Mental disorders can be best understood as akin to 
medical illnesses”). Approximately 70% of participants disagreed with the idea that the 
development of depression is due to biological illness, but they were overall more divided about 
whether they saw it as “akin to a medical illness,” with about 45% disagreeing, 36% agreeing, 
and 19% feeling uncertain. A paired t-test revealed a strong statistically significant relationship 
between these questions as well, t(94) = -3.77, p < .001, d = 0.40, suggesting that the null 
hypothesis can be rejected. It is unlikely that these data findings are due to chance. A different 
hypothesis may instead be supported. This hypothesis is that while participants generally do not 




think depression is due to biological illness, they tend to be more comfortable thinking of it as 
being related to medical illness. 
 A t-test also showed a relationship between Question 22 (M = 2.9, SD = 1.1; “Mental 
disorders can be best understood as akin to medical illnesses”) and Question 8 (M = 2.4, SD = 
1.1; “The DSM-5 diagnosis of depression fully captures the experience of those who suffer from 
it”), t(94) = 3.99, p < .001, d = 0.38. Participants predominantly disagreed with both of these 
questions, and these data show that a weak-to-moderate effect size can be noticed between 
variables. Of further interest was participants’ endorsement of question 11 (“I believe that 
depression is a subjective experience that is difficult to measure quantitatively”) and their 
previously mentioned differences in how comfortable they were with thinking about depression 
as akin to medical illnesses (Question 22). About 70% of respondents agreed with Question 11 
(M = 3.6, SD = .92), with significant results existing between these data also t(94) = -3.92,  
p < .001, d = 0.43. This further supports the notion that participants viewed depression as a 
heavily subjective experience, while still recognizing a value in likening it to different medical 
experiences. 
 In continuing to thoroughly explore data related to Hypothesis 2, Question 24 (“In 
psychotherapeutic practice, the clinician understands an objective truth about how mental health 
can be achieved”) was found to be significantly related to Question 3 (“In the majority of cases, I 
find that depression is defined by individual cultures”). Approximately 66% of participants 
disagreed with Question 24 (M = 2.3, SD = 1.1) while nearly 70% of respondents agreed with 
Question 3 (M = 3.6, SD = .92), t(94) = -9.73, p < .001, d = 1.03. This represents a somewhat 
surprising set of data as it would appear that the majority of respondents did not believe in a 
clinician holding objective truth, but instead appeared to give more weight to the impact of 




culture. The effect size for these data is also quite strong, and so the relationship between these 
questions may be more meaningful than previously thought. These figures gain greater interest 
when responses to Question 25 (“In psychotherapeutic practice, the client and therapist construct 
a subjective reality of how mental health may be achieved”) are considered. About 91% of 
respondents agreed with this question (M = 4.1, SD = .74), further emphasizing the subjective 
nature of clinical work. 
 The ability to measure a person’s experience of depression is often connected to a 
medical model of understanding, and so Question 25 (M = 4.1, SD = .74) was compared with 
Question 10 (M = 2.5, SD = .97; “I believe depression is an objective illness easily measured by 
quantitative scales”). Data between these questions were significant t(94) = -11.80, p < .001,  
d = 1.20, with about 65% of people disagreeing with the idea that depression is easily measured 
by quantitative scales.  
 To conclude examination of Hypothesis 2, Questions 20 (M = 2.6, SD = 1.1; “It is 
important for clients to agree with the diagnoses I give them”) and Question 23 (M = 2.3, SD = 
.91; “In psychotherapeutic practice, it is necessary to have a doctor-patient hierarchy”) were 
compared. Statistically significant results t(93) = 2.50, p = .014, d = .20 showed a small effect 
size, where about 53% of people disagreed with Question 20, 29% agreed, and 18% were 
uncertain. Approximately 70% of participants disagreed with Question 23, with about 15% in 
agreement, and 15% feeling uncertain. These numbers indicate that participants did not tend to 
see a strong value in the doctor-patient hierarchy in psychotherapeutic treatment but tend to be 
more diversified in their beliefs about whether clients need to agree with assigned diagnoses.  
 Overall, participants did tend to strongly endorse ideas consistent with a social 
constructionist mindset, however, they did not necessarily view the medical model as 




decreasingly helpful. When thinking about their work, they often disagreed with significant 
components of a traditionally considered medical model, such as doctor-patient hierarchy, 
biological origins to identified depressive illness, and the ability to objectively measure facets of 
depressive experience. Despite the decreased belief and/or value seen amongst these factors, 
participants did more often feel that comparing mental disorders to medical illnesses can be a 
good way to think about them.  
Hypothesis 3 
 Statistical crosstabulation was again used to begin sorting out survey question data that 
appeared relevant and meaningful from data that were not. Hypothesis 3 is concerned with 
examining trends and beliefs related to the diathesis-stress model. Survey questions inquiring 
about the factors contributing to depression were explored in comparison to relevant questions 
asking about specific views of depression. It should be noted that while the present study 
collected information relevant to a broad understanding of the diathesis-stress model, it did not 
look at discrete variables that may play mediating roles in how a person’s diathesis and stress 
lead specifically to a diagnosis of depression.  
Of particular interest to Hypothesis 3 was Question 1, which specifically asked about 
whether participants thought depression was due to biological illness. As seen when thinking 
about Hypothesis 2, the majority of participants disagreed with Question 1 (M = 2.4, SD = .96). 
When analyzed with Question 4 (M = 3.6, SD = 1.03; “In the majority of cases, I find that the 
development of depression is related to a person’s developmental upbringing”), the results were 
found to be significant t(97) = -8.89, p < .001, d = .90. Cohen’s d shows a strong effect size and 
indicates that the differences between these means may be particularly meaningful. 
Approximately 68% of participants agreed with Question 4, with about 18% in disagreement. 




This data gives weight to the idea that clinicians seem to prioritize the significance of culture and 
individual upbringing over one’s genetic biology when thinking about the etiology of depression. 
 Interestingly, Question 9 (“The presence of depression is a result of societal oppression”) 
was found to be significantly related to Question 1 and Question 2 when utilizing a one-way 
ANOVA for comparing Question 9 with Questions 1–4. About 51% of respondents agreed with 
Question 9, with 24% in disagreement, and 25% feeling uncertain. This may show that there is a 
general lack of consensus about whether societal oppression plays a role, but about half of 
participants thought it did. Significance with Question 1 was found at the .05 level F(4, 91) = 
2.66, p = .037, while its significance with Question 2 was at the .001 level F(4, 91) = 7.55,  
p < .001. This information shows that while participants generally did not feel that biological 
illness plays a primary role in the development of depression (Question 1), they were more 
concerned with the roles of societal oppression (Question 9) and the suffering constructed 
between people (Question 2).  
 Results informing Hypothesis 3 are further aided by responses to Question 10 and 
Question 11, which have been previously described. With 65% of clinicians disagreeing with the 
idea that depression is an “objective illness” that is “easily measured by quantitative scales” and 
70% of clinicians agreeing that it is instead more “subjective,” it would appear that a significant 
majority of participants might question whether specific components of a diathesis-stress 
formulation could realistically be measured in an objective way that would satisfy a 
modernist/naturalist epistemology.  
Consistent with themes discovered within previous hypothesis data, participants strongly 
prioritized the role of culture, socialization, and society over genetics and biology, when thinking 
about depression. While most clinicians are likely to agree with a biopsychosocial lens, broadly 




speaking, they seem not to view one’s biology as a major factor contributing to the development 
of depression. In congruence with a diathesis-stress model, they may recognize that particular 
people are more likely to develop mental illness over others, based on their unique individual 
make-up, but they might be more inclined to consider personal social factors that influence the 
composition of one’s diathesis. 
Hypothesis 4 
 Hypothesis 4 aims to look at whether there might be significant differences between 
participants who had graduated with their doctoral degree, and those who were still doctoral 
program trainees. Table 2 shows the frequencies of participants who were graduated or not 
graduated when broken down by their identified theoretical orientations. 
Graduated and non-graduated participant data were also compared to questions from the 
“Factors Contributing to Depression” portion of the survey. Analysis of variance revealed 
significant variance between the means when compared to Question 3 (“In the majority of cases I 
find that the development of depression is defined by individual cultures”) F(1, 96) = 4.20, p = 
.043. Based on mean scores, respondents who had not yet graduated with their doctoral degrees 
(M = 3.7, SD = 0.87) agreed more with Question 3 than those who had graduated (M = 3.3,  
SD = 0.97). While interesting, it should be noted that the number of participants identifying as 
“graduated” represented a much smaller sample size, and so this increases the likelihood of a 
type 1 error when considering the null hypothesis. 
 Analysis of variance and correlational comparisons were also used to examine graduated 
and non-graduated views related to other survey questions from “views about depression,” 
“views about diagnosis,” “views about the medical model,” and “questions about professional 
practice,” but no other statistically significant data were found. Based on the data collected as a 




part of this research, graduated and non-graduated clinicians were statistically consistent in their 
views with the exception of Question 3. 
 While the present study only minimally explored the ways in which views about 
depression and diagnosis may be changing over time amongst clinical psychologists, it is 
interesting to consider the possibility that newer members of the field are more focused on 
culture than past generations. These sorts of findings likely also speak to the impact that clinical 
and counseling psychology graduate programs are having on their students. If data show that 
much of a clinician’s understanding of depression is shaped by graduate school training 
(Question 13), then it is logical to conclude that these programs have likely changed their 
curriculum over time to reflect new ways of understanding diagnoses and mental illness. If 
connected to intervention, this may also change the way these illnesses are being treated. 
Hypothesis 5 
 Hypothesis 5 sought to explore differences in where participants completed their doctoral 
programs, and the theoretical orientations that they had adopted. Table 3 provides a 
crosstabulation of the frequencies of participants from various portions of the United States when 
compared to their theoretical orientations. “Northwest” was not originally included on the 
survey, however, it was added as a part of analysis to accommodate respondents who responded 
as “other” and identified their program location more specifically. Analysis of variance was 
conducted to examine the theoretical orientation variable with the program location variable, 
however, no statistically significant data were found, F(4, 95) = 1.01, p = .402. It is possible that 
this statistical outcome is based on some of the collected sample sizes. As the crosstabulation in 
Table 3 shows, there were nearly double the number of participants who had attended programs 
in the northeast when compared to the other groups. There were only three respondents 




specifically stating they had attended programs in the northwest, and there were no participants 
who had attended programs in Canada. The majority of participants also fit into the “integrative” 
category, with very few saying they were only utilizing one theoretical model. 
 In combing through other collected data for significant findings, an interesting 
relationship was discovered between participants who had or were seeking PhD’s and those who 
were seeking or currently had PsyD’s. Analysis of variance revealed that those participants 
whose highest sought degree was a PsyD (M = 3.7, SD = 0.77) agreed more with Question 2 (“In 
the majority of cases, I find that the development of depression is due to the suffering 
constructed between people”) than those whose highest degree sought was a PhD (M = 3.1, SD = 
1.02), F(1, 90) = 7.44, p = .008.  
In conclusion, it may be that the location of one’s graduate program does not lead to 
significant changes in the theoretical orientations selected. This might suggest a strong 
consistency in what constitutes a doctoral program in psychology across the country. It is also 
possible that differences that do exist between programs around the country were not detected 
within the survey administered. Other research focusing on different variables, or more discrete 
portions of the same variables might detect subtle changes in how clinical or counseling 
psychology is being taught. From the current research, there exists a possibility that clinicians 
seeking or graduating with PsyD degrees may be more inclined to endorse social constructionist 
views than those with PhD degrees. This could be something further explored in other research. 
Limitations, Discussion, and Suggestions for Future Research 
Limitations 
Several important limitations should be noted when considering the data and discussion 
section below. Of foundational importance to this research is the question of whether a 




quantitative form of data collection and analysis is appropriate in the context of the underlying 
assumptions proposed. In fact, a very related statement was queried to participants in the survey, 
“I believe that depression is an objective illness easily measured by quantitative scales.” One 
might naturally assume that given the emphasis on social constructionism and relevant 
principles, a qualitative inquiry would have been selected. Contrary to this intuition,       
post-modernist thinking and/or constructivist lenses do not assert themselves against quantitative 
inquiry, but they often recognize that the quantitative questions they propose are deeply seated in 
lay and professional contexts that value the construction of narrative through numbers and 
statistical analytics (Hernández, 2015).  
Like the quantitative criticalist approach (Stage & Wells, 2014), the current research has 
consistently proceeded with the recognition that quantitative analysis can be effectively utilized 
for measuring discrepancies and inequities, can be applied for the purposes of challenging the 
status quo, and can be employed for studying people and institutions within the contexts from 
which they are derived (Hernández, 2015). Rather than critiquing quantitative methods as “good” 
or “bad” for having developed out of a post-positivist paradigm, a constructionist approach might 
instead see quantitative tools as narratives to further a broader narrative.  
A second limitation of this research involved the data collected from certain subgroups of 
the sampled population. The theoretical orientation groups varied in size, with small sample sizes 
considering themselves to be solely humanistic or behavioral in orientation. The ability of the 
present research to speak about theoretical orientation differences within the sample remained 
small due to the comparatively minute representation of people from these groups. Future 
research desiring to make more substantial comparisons of this type might utilize different 
strategies for gathering data from psychologists who only adhere to one theoretical orientation. 




Consideration might also be brought to the percentage of participants who had already 
completed their doctorates. While not a number too small to analyze meaningfully, the majority 
of the data in this study came from people in the process of finishing their degrees. It is possible 
that question data became skewed based on the more prominent voice of those in training over 
those who had completed their degrees. It is possible that a study conducted solely with those 
holding doctorates in clinical or counseling psychology might produce different results.  
Another potential limitation may be found in examining other demographic variables. 
The current study sample was predominantly white and female. If it is known that culture plays a 
significant role in one’s conception of mental health and/or depression, then a more diverse 
sample might produce different results based on greater variation in participants’ cultural 
backgrounds. 
Whenever a survey is constructed, the process and procedure of its development and 
analysis will likely also lead to limitations. In this study, a noteworthy limitation may be found in 
the way in which participants were asked about their theoretical orientations. Participants were 
asked to endorse specific theoretical orientations often thought to represent the major paradigms 
guiding the field of clinical psychology. Some participants may have selected one orientation 
feeling that the survey was looking for their primary orientation. There was no integrative option 
in the survey administered, and the integrative category was introduced for the purposes of data 
analysis. Based on this, it is possible that some of the participants only selecting one orientation, 
may actually utilize multiple orientations in their work. Participants could select multiple 
orientations but were not explicitly instructed to do so. 
 
 





The current research attempted to examine relationships between therapist factors as 
compared to views about diagnosis, depression, and the medical model. Hypothesis 1a was 
unable to be confirmed and the current data did not support a meaningful relationship between 
theoretical orientation and views about depression as being more or less socially constructed. 
The current research was surprising, however, in that the majority of clinicians surveyed agreed 
with a variety of clinical sentiments closely connected to a social constructionist lens. This 
appeared to be across theoretical orientations, however as noted previously, there were very few 
participants identifying solely with one specific orientation. Most respondents appeared to fit 
more comfortably within a broad “integrative” lens.  
While far from clear with the present data, these findings may represent a significant shift 
among psychologists toward a post-modern understanding of diagnosis, mental health, and 
clinical practice. Many clinicians may continue to identify within the theoretical orientation 
categories laid down over the past hundred years, but practice within these orientations in a way 
that is much more in line with a social constructionist lens than they might realize. This likely 
speaks to the role of narrative in understanding everything from day-to-day functioning in our 
personal lives, to the scientific realm where we develop labels and categories for simplifying 
communications between professionals (Bruner, 1990). 
Based on the collected data, the importance of graduate school education was also 
emphasized as the majority of participants felt that their understanding of depression was shaped 
by their graduate education. While unremarkably intuitive on the surface, this kind of finding 
serves as a reminder that if conceptions of diagnosis and depression exist within a social/cultural 
epistemology, it is imperative that these professional narratives are carefully constructed by 




those with clinical power, so that those without the same power do not experience increased 
suffering (Gergen et al., 1996). Efforts of this nature would do much to assist clinical psychology 
in advancing its interests in social justice. 
Only a portion of Hypothesis 1b could be confirmed in the present study, and this was 
connected to the finding that clinicians in this survey sample seemed to believe that depression is 
largely socially constructed. In fact, the number of respondents believing depression to be 
predominantly a biological illness was so small, that meaningful statistics could not be conducted 
with such a sample. This finding is surprising considering the greater mental health field’s 
attempt to use medical technologies for identifying mental illness at the biological level 
(Calhoun & Sui, 2016; Goodkind et al., 2015; Madan et al., 2017; Maher & Maher, 1994), 
however, it may be less surprising when the survey sample is considered. It may be expected that 
clinical psychologists, and psychologists-in-training would have a greater focus on social and 
cultural factors of mental illness, given their role and the interventions they utilize. If this 
research were done with more medicalized professionals in the mental health field, the present 
data might have looked significantly different. 
 Questions related to Hypothesis 1b further provided interesting results regarding how 
clinicians tend to use diagnosis in clinical practice. As mentioned earlier in this paper, 
pragmatism plays a key role in social constructionist views, and so the practical use of diagnosis 
was investigated. Findings seemed to reinforce previously discussed notions of diagnosis as a 
clinical tool between professionals and insurance companies, while being seen as less applicable 
for clients. The majority of participants perceived diagnosis to be useful for clinical procedures 
like conceptualization, easing communication between mental health professionals, and planning 
interventions, although they preferred not to actually assign these diagnoses to individuals.  




While potentially beneficial in the sense that this practice might spare clients from a 
detrimental label that negatively shifts their perceptions of self, another potential danger may be 
created. If therapists are having conversations about client functioning that are entirely 
constructed between the therapist and his/her colleagues or scientific literature, then a disconnect 
has been created. This disconnect would exist between the therapist’s understanding of the 
client’s mental health and subsequent healing, and the client’s understanding of their own mental 
health and paths to healing. This pattern may cause the clinical work to suffer as shared 
understandings are sacrificed for incongruence and epistemological differences in the therapeutic 
relationship (Duncan & Miller, 2000). 
While other explanatory factors may play a role in the relationships between these 
variables, it would appear that the role of diagnosis may be changing in clinical practice. The 
sample of individuals and their unique training backgrounds need to be considered, however, 
among psychologists it would seem that diagnosis has been utilized predominantly as clinical 
shorthand for simplifying clinical practices. If so, this would represent a significant change from 
the use of diagnosis in generations past, where it may have been much more common for clients 
to receive a specific diagnosis from a psychologist and then carry that label with them           
post-session/treatment. Existent research does suggest that a gradual trend toward greater 
discretion with diagnostic disclosure is being utilized by a variety of mental health provider types 
(Schulze, 2007). 
Hypothesis 2 findings raised interesting questions about present conceptualizations of 
diagnosis and depression as well. The majority of participants did not think that depression was 
primarily a biological illness, but they did think it appropriate to view it as akin to medical 
illnesses. One can only wonder about exactly why this might be, but several interesting 




possibilities may arise. One idea may take us back to the influence of narrative on clinical 
thinking. It is possible that their perceived value in likening depression to medical illnesses may 
come from the ability to communicate broadly about mental illnesses, with populations that are 
less familiar with the complexities of the diagnostic narrative. Clinicians who do choose to 
disclose client diagnoses may have an easier time saying that depression is similar to “breaking 
your arm,” rather than having to explain the complicated constructive process that has led to the 
diagnosis of depression, or the fact that mental illnesses exist in a much more subjective realm 
than medical illnesses that allow for greater objective scrutiny. 
It may also be hypothesized that viewing depression or mental illness as “akin to medical 
illnesses” provides the long-term connection psychology has desired with the medical field, or 
even the natural science fields before that (Hatfield, 2002; Laungani, 2004). As clinical 
psychology and mental health practices have found their way into the “Health Sciences” family, 
it helps to look and sound similar to our health science siblings, so that people do not begin to 
question the relationship. Significant questioning of this sort would impact the funding available 
for mental health resources, and it might complicate the ways in which a lay public receiving 
mental health treatment would view or respect the work being done (Laungani, 2004). 
 Findings further elucidate current conceptions of the DSM-5. It would appear that while 
clinicians broadly see value in the use of diagnosis for specific clinical purposes, they do not see 
the DSM-5 diagnosis of depression as wholly descriptive of depressed clients’ experiences. In 
many ways this may be connected to previously discussed findings, where clinicians saw the 
diagnosis of depression as part of a deeper cultural construct, where socialization and 
relationships are believed to play significant roles. If culture, relationships, and social 
experiences provide the most fertile ground for the development of depressive experiences, then 




it would seem unlikely that a single universally applied diagnosis could represent these people 
well.  
This may also be a circumstance where similar research with our medical colleagues 
might produce different results. If the current research were done with psychiatrists, primary care 
physicians, or nurses for example, one might expect to see significantly different endorsements 
of the surveyed questions. In a specifically medicalized environment where diagnosis is even 
more likely to dictate a course of treatment, it might not be surprising to find mental health 
diagnoses being thought of as proportionally more similar to medical diagnoses. 
Findings related to Hypotheses 2 and 3 also inform discussion of how measurable 
depression is believed to be. Within medical or diathesis stress models, there is added emphasis 
on one’s ability to measure experiences like depression. According to the current research, 
participants largely felt that depression could not be easily measured by quantitative scales. 
Again, one must be careful about generalizations significantly beyond the parsimonious 
information provided in the data, but based on the current findings, it is reasonable to wonder 
what the collected data might mean. It may be that clinicians are using the variety of objective or 
semi-objective measures that exist for measuring depression but hold a deeper belief that those 
measures can provide only a portion of the overall picture. It could also mean that clinicians are 
utilizing such measures of client depression for other reasons altogether, as directed by 
professional organizations or companies. This would likely create some diversity in clinical 
settings where such measures are used, potentially influencing narratives of how clients’ 
depression is understood. Other possibilities also exist but will be left for exploration in other 
research and other papers. 




Early suppositions of this research regarding the subjective nature of psychotherapy also 
appeared to be confirmed in the current research, with about two thirds of participants denying 
the idea that clinicians hold an objective truth about how to achieve mental health. Pair this with 
the surprising 91% of people who believed in the subjective construction of realities taking place 
in psychotherapy, and a strong post-modern picture begins to emerge. Among members of the 
clinical psychology field, this kind of finding may make sense, however, it is sharply contrasted 
with lay cultural beliefs supposing that mental health providers will have a clear formula for how 
to achieve mental before meeting with a client (Furnham, Pereira, & Rawles, 2001; Furnham & 
Wardley, 1990). 
The Hypothesis 5 finding indicating potential differences between PsyD and PhD 
participants may also feed into this discussion. As stated before, other variables may be at work, 
and generalizations should be taken lightly given their departure from specifically what the data 
suggest. With this in mind, one might wonder whether the emphasis on clinical work within 
PsyD programs is more likely to lead to a constructionist viewpoint than the more            
research-oriented PhD programs. Might there be greater respect for a modernist scientific 
approach if one is asked to focus more time and energy on conducting research in this way? The 
current research provided only the beginnings of an inquiry into potential differences, but they 
would be interesting to explore further in other studies.  
Continuing discussion of the therapeutic relationship in psychotherapy, clinicians tended 
not think a doctor-patient hierarchy was necessary but were mixed in the extent to which they 
felt that clients should agree with diagnoses they provide. At the outset, hypotheses about this 
finding could appear contradictory. For instance, the question may arise, “How can the       
doctor-patient hierarchy not matter, but then a client’s acceptance of a clinician provided 




diagnosis does matter?” These two ideas might seem incompatible when given the recognition 
that providing a diagnosis for a client supports an implicit hierarchy. Alternatively, clinicians 
valuing diagnostic agreement between therapist and client might be viewing this as greater 
opportunity for alignment in the therapeutic relationship, with some (hopefully) concurrent 
discussion of what the diagnosis means and whether it seems accurate to the client’s experience. 
 The presented research also inquired about participants’ views related to societal 
oppression and the development of depression. Approximately one out of every two participants 
believed that the etiology of depression is significantly impacted by the oppression that exists in 
society. This finding may not seem surprising to many within the mental health community, who 
often have a heightened focus on the role of oppression in the development of mental illness 
(Barker, 2015; Hunn & Craig, 2009; Neitzke, 2016).  
This kind of finding does depart in some ways from the longstanding medical model that 
has guided mental health treatment over the last hundred years. In many ways, the present 
research harkens back to early questions of “nature” and “nurture” and arguments about which 
factor matters more in development, mental health, or other psychologically related questions. 
Many early psychologists, psychiatrists, researchers, medical doctors and the like almost 
certainly had an awareness of how both are implicated in mental health issues, however, the 
avenue by which they conceptualized problems and proscribed treatment have unquestionably 
changed. The current research identified a portion of this change as seen in connection to 
Hypothesis 4. Doctoral students in clinical and counseling psychology believed that culture plays 
a role in the development of depression to a greater extent than their already graduated seniors. 
    If a significant portion of the etiology of depression is now viewed as seated within a 
broader cultural lens, with recognition of oppression as a precipitant for this suffering, then 




future psychotherapeutic treatment may begin to look a lot different than it has in past. It may 
spend less time attempting to uncover secrets hidden away deep in the psyche or in chemical 
mechanisms of action, while spending more time exploring cultural beliefs, values, injustices, 
and subjugations that have led a person to feel disconnected from a meaningful group in their 
life. A broad application of many different therapeutic narratives will likely continue to be used, 
but we may at least have a glimpse of the future of mental health treatment as we witness these 
sorts of changes.  
The bottom line, at least from a social constructionist lens, is not that one view or 
perspective is better than the other, but that changes in perspective have pragmatic impacts on 
the way things are done (Gergen, 1994; Gergen et al., 1996). Treatment efficacy hinges on these 
pragmatic impacts and the outcomes that are produced by the mental health work being done. It 
is also very pragmatic to recognize that creating change within an individual is generally going 
to be a great deal easier than creating changes in a society. In this light the mental health 
professional must consider, “What are positive changes I can help this individual make within 
himself or herself, despite knowing that the culture from which they come is at least partially 
responsible for their suffering?” This kind of question does not adopt a deficit model, suggesting 
that the individual is “disordered,” but holds onto the idea that individuals can be empowered, 
strengthened, and taught skills to cope with a world often experienced as unfair. This may build 
autonomy and individuality in ways that support greater mental health and well-being (Finfgeld, 
2004). 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 Future research might consider the further exploration of factors related to theoretical 
orientation and the ways psychotherapy is delivered. In connection to the research presented in 




this paper, it might examine the ways in which diagnostic practices differ between clinicians 
based on their orientations.  Understanding these facets of clinical psychology practice might 
provide meaningful insights into how treatment differs between providers, and the role that 
diagnosis plays, if any. 
 Future research might also pose similar questions to mental health practitioners in 
psychiatry, primary care, and social work disciplines. If the field of clinical psychology is to 
continue moving in a direction similar to medical practice, then it would be important to 
understand similarities and differences between how professionals are thinking about diagnoses. 
This would likely ease collaborative care between these providers and create greater coherence 
in the narratives provided to patients/clients. Based on the current research, it may be 
hypothesized that psychiatrists would be more inclined to view depression through a biological 
lens than psychologists. 
 Another area for continuing research involves the use of diathesis-stress, and its 
relationship to epigenetics. As previously stated, the diathesis-stress model attempts to include 
both biological and social/environmental factors that contribute to the development of mental 
illness. Research in epigenetics enlightens us to the idea that social/environmental variables can 
change a person’s DNA, leading to changes in gene expression and subsequent hereditary 
endowment (Barker, 2018). This kind of research might further highlight the ways in which a 
person’s diathesis is shaped by social/cultural factors, and how these factors influence not only a 
person’s reaction to stress in the present, but how also their individual response is shaped by 
different environmental factors from their ancestors’ past. 
 New research might seek to further understand the ways in which diagnostic practices are 
being used in the therapy room with clients, and within clinical settings. This research might 




create new understanding for treatment delivery and the role that diagnosis plays. For instance, if 
clinicians are primarily using diagnosis to communicate among themselves and to insurance 
companies, it may be helpful to reformat how they are designed so that their practical use may be 
consistent. It may also be helpful for research to examine some of these roles further, so that new 
ways of communicating with insurance companies are constructed, so that clients are not forced 
into a diagnostic category for the purposes of having their treatment covered. 
 Finally, the field of clinical psychology might be aided by new studies exploring the 
benefits of post-modern psychotherapy. The current research would seem to suggest that the 
majority of clinicians hold beliefs consistent with a post-modern view; however, it is clear that 
many other areas of the field remain firmly entrenched in modernist domains. While it is possible 
that modern and post-modern practice can operate together, knowledge and awareness of how 
this is being down would seem paramount. This might allow for the benefits of each perspective 
to be reinforced and supported, while the weaknesses are mindfully avoided.  
 In order to construct the most effective research, the most beneficial treatments, and the 
most egalitarian relationships, it is necessary to examine not only where the field currently is, but 
where it has been. The further we move chronologically from our roots, the more likely we are to 
forget their importance. A strong clinical psychology profession will require all of the 
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Hello, my name is Chris Johnson and I’m interested in collecting survey data from 
doctoral-level clinicians who are currently practicing, or who have practiced clinically at some 
point in their careers. I am also interested in collecting data from current doctoral-level students 
in either clinical or counseling psychology programs, who have begun treating clients as a part of 
a practicum, internship, or other training experience. This brief survey is a part of my doctoral 
dissertation research at Antioch University New England. 
This survey is anonymous and will require you to answer questions about your theoretical 
orientation and views surrounding the etiology of depression. It will also include questions about 
your views related to clinical diagnosis and the medical model of treatment. The survey will 
conclude by asking questions about your use of diagnoses in clinical practice. As a way of 
thanking you for your time, you will have the opportunity to enter a drawing for a $50 
Amazon.com gift card. Please click the link below to continue to further information about the 



















Dear Prospective Participant, 
 
This survey attempts to gather information from psychologists who are currently in clinical 
practice, and those who have practiced at some point during their careers. It also seeks 
information from psychologists-in-training. It seeks to examine your views regarding the use of 
diagnosis and will ask you about your specific perceptions regarding the diagnosis of depression. 
This survey is also interested in your thoughts on the medical model and will include questions 
to that effect.  
 
Your responses will assist in providing information about the use of diagnostic conceptualization 
in the 21st century, while adding knowledge to the existing scholarly literature on how various 
theoretical models influence clinical practice. 
 
There are minimal, if any, risks from participating. Your identity will be completely anonymous 
and confidential. You will not be asked for your name, and all demographic information 
collected will be reported as aggregated information. No personally identifiable information will 
be associated with your responses to any reports of these data. This survey will take 
approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
 
This survey is part of my dissertation research at Antioch University New England in the Psy.D.  
in Clinical Psychology program. The study results may be included in future presentations and 
publications. 





At the end of the survey you will have the opportunity to enter a drawing to win a $50 Amazon 
gift card. To enter, you need only submit an email address to be contacted at should your 
entrance be drawn. Email addresses will be kept entirely separate from survey data and cannot be 
used to connect individuals to their survey responses. 
 
Your participation is voluntary, and you may decide to discontinue the survey at any time. If you 
do fill out the survey, you may leave any questions blank, but I ask that you answer as many 
questions as you can. If you should have any questions about the survey, please email me at 
(redacted). 
 
This project has been approved by the Institutional Review Board at Antioch University New 
England. If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact Dr. 
Kevin Lyness at 603-283-2149. You may also contact AUNE interim provost, Dr. Barbara 
Andrews by email at bandrews@antioch.edu or by phone at 603-283-2436. 
 
I have read and understood the above information. By clicking “Next” below, I am indicating 
that I have read and understood this consent form and agree to participate in this research study. 
 
Please print a copy of this page for your records. 
Thank you for your participation! 
Chris Johnson, M.S. 
 











Demographic and Program Information 
Gender? _____ Male _____ Female _____ Transgender 
_____ Other (please specify): ________________ 
 
Race/ethnicity? (select all that apply) 
_____ American Indian/Alaska Native _____ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
_____ Asian/ Asian American  _____ White 
_____ Black or African American  _____ Biracial  
_____ Latino/Hispanic/Latinx  _____ Other (please specify):    




Sexual Orientation? _____ Heterosexual _____ Gay _____ Lesbian  _____ Pansexual 
_____ Bisexual _____ Asexual Other: _______________ 
 
Marital Status? _____ Single _____ In a committed relationship _____ Married 
_____ Divorced _____ Widowed 
 
Highest degree earned at present: _____ Bachelor’s _____ Master’s _____ PhD 
_____ PsyD  _____ Other (please specify): _______________ 
 
Highest degree anticipated: _____ Bachelor’s  _____ Master’s _____ PhD 
_____ PsyD  _____ Other (please specify): _______________ 
 
Type of Graduate Program Attended: _____ Clinical  _____ Counseling   
     
Training Track of Specialty (select multiple if needed): _____ Child _____ Adult  
_____ General  _____ Health  _____ Community  
_____ Neuropsychology _____ Other (please specify): _______________ 
 
Have you already graduated with your doctoral degree? Yes_____ No______ 
  
If No: 
Current Year of Study in Graduate Program: _____ 1st _____ 2nd _____ 3rd  
_____ 4th  _____ 5th _____ 6th _____ 7th _____ 8th or later  
If Yes: 
Are you a clinician currently in clinical practice, or a clinician who has practiced in the past? 




Currently Practicing__________  Practiced in the Past___________ 
 
Year of graduation from program (or anticipated year): _____ 
Where is/was your program located?: _____ USA (Midwest) _____ USA (Northeast)  
_____ USA (South)  _____ USA (West) _____ Canada 
 
How would you primarily describe your views from a theoretical stand point? 







 Other ______________________ 
 
Views about Factors Contributing to Depression 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below 
discussing the factors contributing to the diagnosis of depression. 
1. In the majority of cases, I find that the development of depression is due to biological 
illness. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree____ 
2. In the majority of cases, I find that the development of depression is due to the suffering 
constructed between people. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree____ 
3. In the majority of cases, I find that depression is defined by individual cultures. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree____ 
4. In the majority of cases, I find that the development of depression is related to a person’s 
developmental upbringing. 
  Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree____ 
 




Views about Depression 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements 
regarding the diagnosis of depression. 
5. Depression is a universal phenomenon, presenting itself similarly in people around the 
world.     
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree____ 
6. Depression is made up of symptoms that everyone experiences at some point during 
their lifetime. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
7. Depression is made up of symptoms that only a certain percentage of the population will 
experience during their lifetime. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
8. The DSM-5 diagnosis of depression fully captures the experience of those who suffer 
from it. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
9. The presence of depression is a result of societal oppression. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
10.  I believe depression is an objective illness easily measured by quantitative scales. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
11. I believe depression is a subjective experience that is difficult to measure quantitatively. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
12. My understanding of depression is significantly impacted by my cultural upbringing. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
13. My understanding of depression has been significantly shaped by my graduate school 
education. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
Views about Diagnosis 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements 
regarding diagnosis. 
14. Diagnosis is useful for easing communication between mental health professionals. 




 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
15. Diagnosis is useful for conceptualizing client cases. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
16. Diagnosis is useful for developing treatment interventions. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
17. Diagnosis is useful for completing billing procedures with insurance companies. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
18. Diagnosis is useful for providing clients with a language for understanding their 
suffering. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
19. Diagnosis is useful for helping clients to create a story of their suffering. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
20. It is important for clients to agree with the diagnosis I give them. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
21. It is unimportant for clients to agree with the diagnosis I give them. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
Views about the Medical Model 
Please answer the following questions regarding your views on the medical model of 
understanding psychological illness and using diagnosis. 
22. Mental disorders can be best understood as akin to medical illnesses. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
23. In psychotherapeutic practice, it is necessary to have a doctor-patient hierarchy. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
24. In psychotherapeutic practice, the clinician understands an objective truth about how 
mental health can be achieved. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
25. In psychotherapeutic practice, the client and therapist construct a subjective reality of 
how mental health may be achieved. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
 




Questions about Professional Practice 
Please answer the following questions regarding your professional experience of using 
diagnosis. 
26. I discuss the diagnoses I give with the client’s I give them to. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
27. If I had the option I would prefer to assign people diagnoses. 
   Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
28. In my clinical work I have found diagnosis to be useful. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
29. Most clients have their own understanding of their depression that doesn’t match the 
DSM-5 criteria. 
 Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____  Agree____  Strongly Agree_____ 
30. Most clients have an understanding of their depression that matches the DSM-5 criteria 
well. 








































































Q1.  In the majority of cases, I find that the development of 
depression is due to biological illness. 
 Q2. In the majority of cases, I find that the development of 
depression is due to the suffering constructed between 
people. 
Q3. In the majority of cases, I find that depression is defined by 
individual cultures. 
Q4. In the majority of cases, I find that the development of 
depression is related to a person’s developmental 
upbringing. 
 
Q5.      Depression is a universal phenomenon, presenting itself 
similarly in people around the world.     
Q6.      Depression is made up of symptoms that everyone 
experiences at some point during their lifetime. 
Q7.      Depression is made up of symptoms that only a certain 
percentage of the population will experience during their 
lifetime. 
Q8.      The DSM-5 diagnosis of depression fully captures the 
experience of those who suffer from it. 
Q9.      The presence of depression is a result of societal oppression. 
Q10.    I believe that depression is an objective illness easily 
measured by quantitative scales. 
Q11.    I believe that depression is a subjective experience that is 
difficult to measure quantitatively. 
Q12.    My understanding of depression is significantly impacted by 
my cultural upbringing. 
Q13.    My understanding of depression has been significantly shaped 
by my graduate school education. 
 
Q14.    Diagnosis is useful for easing communication between mental 
health professionals. 
Q15.    Diagnosis is useful for conceptualizing client cases. 
Q16.    Diagnosis is useful for developing treatment interventions. 
Q17.    Diagnosis is useful for completing billing procedures with 
insurance companies. 
Q18.    Diagnosis is useful for providing clients with a language for 
understanding their suffering. 





















Q19.    Diagnosis is useful for helping clients to create a story of 
their suffering. 
Q20.    It is important for clients to agree with the diagnosis I give 
them. 
Q21.    It is unimportant for clients to agree with the diagnosis I 
give them. 
 
Q22.   Mental disorders can be best understood as akin to medical 
illnesses. 
Q23.    In psychotherapeutic practice, it is necessary to have a 
doctor patient hierarchy. 
Q24.    In psychotherapeutic practice, the clinician understands an 
objective truth about how mental health can be achieved. 
Q25.    In psychotherapeutic practice, the client and therapist 
construct a subjective reality of how mental health may be 
achieved. 
 
Q26.    I discuss the diagnoses I give with the clients I give them 
to. 
Q27.    If I had the option I would prefer to assign people 
diagnoses. 
Q28.    In my clinical work I have found diagnosis to be useful. 
Q29.    Most clients have their own understanding of their 
depression that doesn’t match the DSM-5 criteria. 
Q30.    Most clients have an understanding of their depression 

















Theoretical Orientation Comparison with Current Graduation Status 
Theoretical Orientation 
 Psychodynamic Humanistic Behavioral CBT Integrative Total 




Yes 3 0 0 2 23 28 
No 8 2 3 14 45 72 























Program Location Comparison with Theoretical Orientation 
 
 
            Theoretical Orientation 




USA (Midwest) 1 1 1 6 8 17 
USA (Northeast) 8 1 0 2 29 40 
USA (South) 0 0 0 4 16 20 
USA (West) 2 0 2 3 13 20 
USA 
(Northwest) 
0 0 0 1 2 3 






















































































Year of Graduation from Graduate Program (or anticipated year)
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How would you describe your views from a theoretical standpoint? (Check 
all that apply)
Responses
